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A private annuity, for the purposes of this article, is an agreement
by an annuity writer, an individual,' to make a series of equal payments
to the annuitant, another individual, for the life of the annuitant.2
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1. Annuities written by charities and other organizations that write annuities from time
to time are governed by a somewhat different set of rules. A discussion of these annuities is
beyond the scope of this article. Rev. Rul. 62-136, 1962-2 C.B. 12.
2. Middleditch, Report of the Subcommittee on Private Annuities and Estate Planning,
102 TR. & EsT. 952 (1963). Private annuities can also be written for the life of an annuitant
for a term certain greater than the life expectancy of the annuitant, whichever term ends
sooner, a private annuity for a term of years or PATY. See generally Hartz & Banoff,
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Private annuities provide security for the annuitant, because the an-
nuitant cannot outlive the stream of payments.' Because of the risk
that an annuitant might outlive her life expectancy, however, prospec-
tive transferees of the property of an older relative are often unwilling
to take on such an obligation. 4 Therefore, private annuities have been
an often-discussed but seldom-used estate planning device.' Estate
planners have used the private annuity, and other techniques, to limit
the growth of a client's gross estate, or "freeze" the estate.6 By
exchanging a property that may be increasing in value for an annuity,
which will only become less valuable over time, transferors can limit
their estate tax liability. 7 Congress has recently enacted legislation to
stop estate tax avoidance though the use of estate-freezing techniques.'
Private annuities may become more popular in light of the 1988 tax
revision, however, because they are one of the few estate-freezing
techniques that may survive the estate tax provisions enacted to render
estate freezes ineffective.
9
Private annuities hold a certain fascination for tax and estate
planning scholars.10 Because private annuities involve concepts both of
Planning Opportunities Available Using Private Annuities for a Term of Years, 65 J. TAX'N
302 (1986) (discussing the private annuity for a term of years). An annuity written for a period
of years shorter than the life expectancy of the annuitant will be treated as an installment
sale. Rev. Rul. 86-72, 1986-1 C.B. 253. A discussion of private annuities for a term of years
is beyond the scope of this article.
3. Annuitants do, however, take the risk that the annuity writer will be unable to make
the payments throughout the annuitant's life. This is one of the principal reasons that some
prospective annuitants decide not to enter into private annuity contracts. Ekman, Private
Annuities, 22 Omo ST. L.J. 279, 280-81 (1961); Subcommittee Report, supra note 2, at 959.
4. Subcommittee Report, supra note 2, at 958.
5. Covey, Estate, Gift, and Income Taxation, 1969 Developments, 4 Mtix INST. ON
EsT. PLAN. 70.102.1 (1969).
6. See generally Abbin, The Value-Capping Cafeteria-Selecting the Appropriate Freeze
Technique, 15 INsT. ON EsT. PLAN. 2000-2015 (1980).
7. Id. at 2001, 2001.2.
8. I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1989). All references to the Internal Revenue Code refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended to September 20, 1989, unless otherwise indicated.
9. See infra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
10. Manning and Hesch, Private Annuities After the Installment Sales Revision Act of
1980, 6 REv. OF TAX'N OF IrDvs. 20 (1982) (hereafter Manning & Hesch); Ginsburg, Future
Payment Sales After the 1980 Revision Act, 39 INST. ON FED. TAX'N §§ 43.01-43.11 (1981)
(hereafter Ginsburg, 1980 Revision); Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 TAx
L. RFv. 471 (1975) (hereafter, Ginsburg, Future Payment); Stewart, Private Annuities-Revenue
Ruling 69-74 Partially Repudiated, Sub Silentio, by Treasury Regulation Section 1.1011-2(c),
Example (8), 24 MERCER L. REV. 585 (1973); Midgley, Federal Income Taxation of Private
Annuitants, 40 GEo. vASH. L. REv. 679 (1972); Ross, The Private Annuity as a Tax Minimizing
Instrument, 41 TAxEs 199 (1963); Wallace, Taxation of Private Annuities, 40 B.U.L. REv. 349
(1960); Davey, Property Exchanged for a Promise to Pay an Annuity-Transferee Problems,
33 TAXES 494 (1955); Meyer, Transfer of Property for an Annuity-Tax Position of the
Transferee, 31 TAxEs 645 (1953); Andro, Non-Commercial Annuities-Income Tax Conse-
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annuities and of property sales, and because of the indeterminable
stream of payments involved, the resolutions of issues like gain rec-
ognition and computation of basis are rarely satisfying. Therefore,
writers are constantly tempted to criticize the rules formerly in effect
and attempt to come to solutions more clearly in line with underlying
tax principles.
For income tax purposes, private annuities have proven to be a
problem, primarily because the duration of payments to be made to
the annuitant is uncertain. Several income tax issues are involved in
private annuities. As with annuities purchased for cash, the tax statute
must reflect the fact that each payment consists of a return of the
principal invested in the annuity and of income earned from that
principal. When the annuitant transfers appreciated property to the
annuity writer in exchange for the annuity, additional questions arise
about when to recognize the gain or loss in the annuitant's transferred
property. For the annuity writer, the most important questions are
whether any part of the annuity payments can be deducted as interest
and how to compute the basis in the acquired property."
The actuarial principles underlying annuities had been established
for centuries before enactment of the modem income tax.12 American
income tax statutes before 1954, however, treated annuities with little
regard to their economic principles. 3 Even after adopting a more
rational scheme for taxing annuities in section 72 of the 1954 Internal
Revenue Code,' 4 complete conformity with the economic principles of
annuities still have not been achieved. The Internal Revenue Service
has attempted to establish uniform principles for the taxation of private
annuitants" and private annuity writers 6 by promulgating comprehen-
sive Revenue Rulings. Amendments to the Internal Revenue Code
during the 1980's, however, particularly changes in the treatment of
installment sales, annuities, and imputed interest, have cast doubt on
the Service's rulings. In addition, development of new estate planning
devices, particularly the Death Terminating Installment Sale, econom-
ically similar to the private annuity but with different income tax
quences to the Transferor Who Exchanges Property in Return for an Annuity, 9 TAx L. REv.
85 (1953); Galvin, Income Tax Consequences of Agreements Involving Non-Commercial
Annuities, 29 TEx. L. REV. 469 (1951) (hereafter Galvin).
11. See Galvin, supra note 10.
12. See infra notes 21-28 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 60-161 and accompanying text.
14. I.R.C. § 72(a)-(c) (1954). See also infra notes 162-182 and accompanying text.
15. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
16. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-2 C.B. 352.
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consequences, require a reconsideration of the income tax consequences
of private annuities.
This article will briefly review the history and actuarial principles
underlying annuities.17 It will then review the history of the tax
treatment of private annuities and the current state of the law, first
for annuitants and then for annuity writers.18 Finally, this paper will
propose a revision of the Internal Revenue Service rulings governing
private annuities. 9 This article will concentrate on three issues involved
in transfers of appreciated property in exchange for private annuities-
the annuitant's gain recognition, the annuity writer's potential interest
deduction, and the basis for the annuity writer in the property acquired
in exchange for the private annuity.20 This article will recommend: (1)
That the gain inherent in the property transferred by annuitants be
recognized ratably over the life expectancy of the annuitant according
to the annuity, rather than the installment sales, provisions of the
Code; (2) that annuity writers be permitted to treat a portion of each
annuity payment as interest; and (3) that, in most cases, annuity
writers use the actuarial value of the annuity as their basis in the
acquired property.
I. HISTORY AND TH:EORY OF ANNUITIES
A. History of Annuities
Both the theory and the business practice of writing annuities were
well established before the adoption of the modern income tax in
1913. The rudiments of the actuarial principles of annuities were
developed in Europe in the seventeenth century.2' European govern-
ments in the seventeenth century arranged government loan repayments
17. See infra notes 29-42 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 60-284 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 274-351 and accompanying text.
20. This article will not deal with whether the creation of the private annuity will be treated
as retention of the income from the transferred property. See Loftis, When Can a Trust Be Used
to Fund a Private Annuity Without Creating a Retained Interest?, 14 EsT. PLAN. 218 (1987) and
the cases cited therein for a discussion of this problem. This article will also not deal with the
application of related party loss or gain rules to private annuities. See I.R.C. §§ 267, 1239.
21. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Annuities 1, 2 (1957). The first reference to the value
of an annuity is "the provisions of the Roman lex Falcidia of 40 B.C.; but the tables of
values were the result of conjecture rather than of statistical investigation, and the element of
interest was not taken into account." Id.
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in the form of annuities. In exchange for lending money to the
government, the lender received an annuity. By 1671, the "grand
pensionary of Holland and West Friesland worked out the practical
rule that, taking interest at four percent, a life annuity to a healthy
young person was worth sixteen times its yearly amount." 22 To illus-
trate, a healthy, young burgher in Holland in the late seventeenth
century would lend 1600 guilders to the government and would receive
his repayment in the form of an annuity of 100 guilders per year.
John Graunt developed the first accurate mortality tables in England
in 1662, so that the life expectancy information necessary to value
annuities was available. 23 In 1693, Edmund Halley produced another
mortality table and, more importantly, demonstrated how the tables
could be used to compute the value of annuities.24 In 1808, the British
government began publishing mortality tables, and by 1875, the English
actuary, A.J. Finlaison, had determined that annuitants tended to be
longer-lived than the general population.2?
As in many other fields of knowledge and business practice, Amer-
icans borrowed British expertise. American life insurance companies
issued annuities during the ninteenth century, basing their computations
on British tables. 26 An American actuary, Emory McClintock of what
is now Mutual of New York, published the first annuity table based
on American mortality experience in 1899, and by 1920 many other
companies had followed suit. 27 A Pennsylvania Common Pleas judge,
writing one year before the adoption of the modern Federal income
tax, recognized that "the calculation of an annuity is an extremely
intricate mathematical problem. It is a matter of pure science; it is
not a question of fact.''2 Therefore, at the time the income tax was
enacted, the mathematical formulae necessary to understand and com-
pute annuities had been available for more than two centuries, and
the mortality tables reflecting American life expectancies were widely
available.
22. Encyclopedia Britannica, Annuities 75-78 (1 1th ed.), cited in Wolf v. Schmidt & Sons
Brewing Co., 21 Pa. Dist. Rpts. 164, 166 (1912).
23. Graunt published his findings, based largely on church and local records, in his book
NATuRAI AND PoLaIcAL OBSERVATIONS ... Made upon the Bills of Mortality in 1662. 4
ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Demography 6 (1976).
24. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, Annuities 1, 2 (1957).
25. Id. at 3.
26. 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANMCA, Annuities 1, 4 (1957).
27. Id.
28. Wolf v. Schmidt & Sons Brewing Co., 21 Pa. Dist. Rpts. 164, 167 (1912).
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B. Theory of Annuities
Understanding the tax law applicable to annuities is difficult without
first understanding the mathematical and demographic basics of an-
nuity computations. The single-life annuity is a stream of payments
that will terminate upon the death of the measuring life, usually the
life of the annuitant. 29 In a typical annuity transaction, Aunt Anne
would pay Really Secure Insurance Company a sum of money in
exchange for the company's promise to make periodic payments to
Aunt Anne for her life. Really Secure's actuaries must estimate how
much Aunt Anne will receive based on mortality statistics, future
investment returns, and the company's costs associated with the annuity
to know how much to charge Aunt Anne. To understand the complex
process of computing the value of a single-life annuity, it is first
important to understand the simpler process of computing the value
of a stream of payments for a set period 0 The value of an annuity
is the sum of the present values of each of the payments that the
annuitant will receive. The value of each payment is the amount that
will be paid in the future, discounted by the amount of interest that
the payor can earn on the fund until the payment must be made to
the annuitant. 1 After deciding the amount to be paid each year and
the term of the payments, one need only determine the rate of interest
that a deposit will earn to determine the principal amount needed to
pay an annuity. Because interest rates fluctuate, the actual interest
that the payor may earn is unknown. Instead, to compute the value
of an annuity one must make an assumption about what the interest
rate will be, and the usual assumption is that the current interest rate
will remain in effect for the term of the annuity.32 In valuing annuities,
29. Johnson, Special Commentary: Discounting and Compounding with the Addition of
Single Life Contingencies-Calculation of the Present Value of an Annuity, Life Estate, Term
for Years, Remainder, or Reversion Involving One Life on a Term Certain, 11 S. ILL. L.J.
315, 316 (1986), (hereafter Johnson, Special Commentary I1). See also R. MEHR & E. CAMMACK,
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE 538 (4th ed. 1966).
30. The principles in the following discussion of valuing annuities and the order of
discussion are based upon Johnson's Special Commentary, published in four parts in volumes
11 and 12 of the Southern Illinois Law Journal. The author used the first two parts of the
Special Commentary. See supra note 29 (second part); Johnson, Special Commentary: Dis-
counting and Compounding-Calculation of the Present Value of an Annuity, Term for Years,
Remainder, or Reversion Dependent on a Term Certain, 11 S. IL. L.J. 87 (1986) (first part)
(hereafter Johnson, Special Commentary 1).
31. Johnson, Special Commentary I, supra note 30, at 111.
32. Id. at 96.
276
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the Treasury Department prescribes tables based upon an approxi-
mation of the interest rates at the time the parties contract for their
annuity.
33
To take a simple example, consider a three-year annuity of $1,000
per year. The three payments are to be made exactly one year, two
years, and three years after the parties entered into the transaction.
Assuming an 8% rate and annual compounding of interest, the present
value of the first year's payment is $925.93, computed by dividing the
amount of the payment by one plus the rate of interest, here 1.08 .34
The present value of the second payment, which requires the consid-
eration of compound interest, is $1,000 divided by the square of 1.08
or $857.34. The present value of the third payment, $1,000 divided
by the cube of 1.08, is $793.83. The total present value of such an
annuity when the contract is entered into is $2,577. 10. 3
In an annuity measured by a life, the value of the annuity is a
function of both interest and the life expectancy of the annuitant.
36
Mortality tables are the foundation of life expectancy computation.
Ideally, life expectancies would be based on studies of all people born
in a year, keeping track of their mortality throughout life. Such studies
are not feasible, and so, instead of following one cohort for a lifetime,
demographers assume that the current population represents how the
various annual cohorts in the current population will survive as they
age. 37 Standard mortality tables show the number of people alive at
certain ages out of a hypothetical starting population of 100,000 people
of the same age. The table cannot be used to predict whether any
individual will survive to a given age, but the table can be used to
estimate the probability of the individual surviving to a certain age. 38
The cost of an annuity for a person of any age is computed as a
weighted average of the cost of providing annuities for an entire
population. For each year, payments would have to be made only to
the number of people still alive. Also the amount of money that would
33. Id. at 96-99. Johnson finds two problems with the Treasury tables. First, that they
reflect nominal, rather than real, rates of return, and second, that the tables have too seldom
been adjusted to reflect current rates of return. Id. Internal Revenue Code section 7520,
adopted in 1988, requires the Treasury Dept. to adjust such tables monthly to reflect current
mortality experience and interest rates.
34. Johnson, Special Commentary 1, supra note 30, at 107.
35. See Johnson, Special Commentary II, supra note 29, at 328.
36. Johnson, Special Commentary I, supra note 30, at 96, citing L. WoLFE & W.
CORCORAN, INsIurANCE TAx CALCULAAnONs 7 (1937).
37. Johnson, Special Commentary II, supra note 29, at 318-19.
38. Id. at 319.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
be deposited now to provide such annuities would be the present value,
taking account of the amount of interest that would be earned by the
deposit between the date of deposit and the date of payment. There-
fore, for each year of the annuity, the amount to be paid would be
the amount of the payment multiplied by a fraction that takes account
of both life expectancy and the time value of money.39
Assume that on January 1, 1991, we wish to put aside a sum to
provide for a payment of $1 each to 100,000 people, aged forty, that
would survive for one year, until January 1, 1992. To take account
of the number of people who die during 1991, we would divide the
number of people expected to survive until January 1, 1992, 1x,, by
the total number of people in our original population of forty-year-
olds, Ix. To take account of the time value of money, we would
multiply our fraction by a discount factor reflecting the time value of
money, V. Our final formula, for an annuity paid for just one year
would be lx, V/lx. Computing the total cost of a life annuity for our
population requires us to add up the cost of each year's annuity for
all future years until the mortality table informs us that our population
wili have died out. The formula would be as follows:
lxI V/Ix + 1x2 V2 / Ix + lx3 V3 / Ix + ... + lx, Vn /Ix, or
lx, V + lx2 V2 + 1x3 V3 + ... + lx, Vn Ix (where n equals the
last age).40
Annuity tables, such as the old valuation table for annuities in the
estate tax regulations, 4' provide simple decimal fractions for each age
that can be multiplied by the annual annuity payments to complete
the value of an annuity. The authors of the tables apply the formula
above, beginning with the current age of a cohort of annuitants, to
39. Id. at 328-332.
40. Id. at 329-330. These computations approximate what an insurance company might
do in accumulating an annuity fund and paying out to a group of customers. In a large
population, the company's mortality gains from short-lived annuitants would tend to offset
the losses from annuitants who outlived their expectancies. In private annuities between
individuals, however, mortality gains or losses without any offset affect the resources of the
annuity writer. One would expect parties entering into a private annuity for an estate planning
purpose to have consulted a knowledgeable adviser. The predictions of annuity tables, however,
are often secondary to other considerations in private annuities. If the parties are only concerned
about the investment return and security in the transaction, they probably would use a
commercial annuity. Galvin, Income Tax Consequences of Agreements Involving Noncom-
mercial Annuities, 29 TEx. L. Ray. 469, 479 (1951). On this point, Galvin quotes Steinbach
Kresge Co. v. Sturgess, 33 F.Supp. 897, 900 (D.N.J. 1940), as follows: "The fact is that the
annuitant deliberately forsook the insurance market and established his own. Actuarial values
per se have, therefore, no logical bearing upon the value of a noncommercial annuity contract
issued in return for property." Id.
41. Treas. Reg. § 20.2032-7, Table A, T.D. 7955, 1984-1 C.B. 40, 81.
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compute the decimal fraction for each age. 42 With some understanding
of the theory of annuities, it is now possible to explore the use of
private annuities in estate planning.
C. The Use of Private Annuities in Estate Planning
The private annuity is an estate-freezing device 43 that enables older
persons to replace appreciated property in their estates with an asset
that disappears at death. In a typical private annuity transaction, for
example, Aunt Anne would like to transfer property that has increased
in value since Anne acquired it to a relative. Anne would also like to
provide for a steady income to help to support her in her declining
years. Aunt Anne, the annuitant, achieves her aims by trading her
appreciated property to her niece, Nettie, the annuity writer, for a
stream of payments ending at Aunt Anne's death. Aunt Anne loves
the security of the annuity, but she may find it difficult to convince
Nettie to assume the obligation to make payments for the rest of Aunt
Anne's life, because of the risk that Anne might outlive her life
expectancy. 44
The federal estate and gift tax consequences of such transactions,
before the enactment of recent legislation to limit estate freezing
techniques, 4 were fairly well settled. The annuity would be valued
according to tables published by the Department of the Treasury.
46
The transferor was not treated as making a gift unless the value of
the property transferred exceeded the value of the annuity. If so,
then the difference was treated as a gift from Aunt Anne to Nettie
for gift tax purposes. 47 Because the obligation to make payments
42. Johnson, Special Commentary II, supra note 29, at 330-333. The former valuation
tables have become obsolete. In response to Internal Revenue Code section 7520(c)(3), enacted
by section 5031 of TAMRA of 1988, Pub. L. 100-467, 102 Stat. 3342 (1988), which requires
the Treasury Department to promulgate new valuation tables reflecting current interest and
current mortality experience, the Internal Revenue Service has promulgated Notice 89-60, 1989-
22 I.R.B. 16, which provides mathematical factors only for remainder interests. Taxpayers and
their advisers now must compute their own annuity factors according to instructions given in
Notice 89-24, 1989-10 I.R.B. 16. Id.
43. Abbin, Value Capping Cafeteria, Selecting the Appropriate Freeze Technique, 15
MtMwu EST. PLAN. INST. 2000-2015 (1981).
44. Subcommittee Report, supra note 4, at 958.
45. I.R.C. § 2036(c) (1989).
46. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, 44 (hereafter Rev. Rul. 69-74). Rev. Rul. 80-80,
1980-1 C.B. 194 requires the use of the Treasury Department tables unless the annuitant's
death is "imminent" at the time the annuity was written. Id. at 195.
47. Rev. Rul. 69-74 at 44.
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disappeared at the death of the annuitant, absent section 2036(c), 48
the annuity escaped the decedent's gross estate.49 The private annuity
transaction may even avoid estate taxation under newly revised section
2036(c), if properly planned. 0
Congress enacted section 2036(c) in 1987, 51 and revised it in 1988,52
to prevent taxpayers from using recapitalizations and similar "estate
freezing" techniques to avoid the estate tax. 3 An illustration of an
estate-freezing recapitalization may help the reader to understand
section 2036(c). Aunt Anne, the transferor, is owner of 100% of the
common stock of Growing Corp. In the recapitalization, she would
exchange her common stock for voting preferred stock (limited and
preferred as to dividends and on liquidation, but having voting
control of the corporation). Anne would also receive common stock
that is less than 50% of the voting control, and Anne would transfer
the common stock to her niece, Nettie. At the time of the recapital-
ization and gift of the common stock to Nettie, the value of the
preferred stock would approximately equal the value of the corpo-
ration before the recapitalization. Therefore, the value of the gift to
Nettie is negligible. As the value of Growing Corp. increases, how-
48. I.R.C. § 2036(c).
49. I.R.C. §§ 2033, 2036 (1986). For a more thorough discussion of the estate tax
consequences of private annuities, see Bilansky, Making the Most of Private Annuity Arrange-
ments to Transfer Property and Reduce Estate Tax, 8 EsT. PLAN. 102 (1981).
50. The key to avoiding section 2036(c) is meeting the "substantial consideration" rule
of section 2036(c)(2)03), an exception to the general rule of section 2036(c)(1). The decedent's
estate must establish that the family member who wrote the annuity provided full consideration
"in money or money's worth" for the property received and establishes that the annuity writer
paid with the writer's own money, rather than income from the transferred property or other
funds originally provided by the annuitant. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(B)(i)(I) (1989). Those planning
the transaction must be able to establish "to the satisfaction of the Secretary" that the
"consideration originally belonged to such member and was never received or acquired (directly
or indirectly) by such member from the transferor for less than full and adequate consideration
in money or money's worth." I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2)(3)(i)(II) (1989). See Blattmachr & Gans, An
Analysis of the TAMRA Changes to the Valuation Freeze Rules: Part II, 70 J. TAX'N 74
(1989).
51. I.R.C. § 1042(b), Pub. L. 100-203 (1987).
52. I.R.C. § 3031, Pub. L. 100-647 (1988). The general rule of the legislation to prevent
estate freezes, paragraph (1) of section 2036(c), reads as follows:
(c) Inclusion Related to Valuation Freezes.-
(1) In general-For purposes of subsection (a), if-
(A) any person holds a substantial interest in an enterprise, and
(B) such person in effect transfers, after December 17, 1987, property having a
disproportionately large share of the potential appreciation in such person's interest
in the enterprise while retaining an interest in the income of, or rights in, the
enterprise, then the retention of the retained interest shall be considered to be a
retention of the enjoyment of the transferred property.
Id.
53. H.R. RP. No. 391, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 1042-1044 (1987).
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ever, the value of the preferred stock remains frozen, while the value
of the common stock increases. By the time of Anne's death, Nettie
may own much of the value of Growing Corp. even though little or
no transfer tax was paid on the transfer of wealth.14 Section 2036(c)
treats Anne's retention of such a frozen interest as though she had
retained the income from the common stock transferred to Nettie,
and under section 2036(a), if Anne transfers property to someone
else and retains the income from the transferred property, the prop-
erty must be included in Anne's gross estate at her death.
55
Because a private annuity replaces property that may appreciate with
a contract that gives an income stream to the annuitant and that will
gradually decline in value over the life span of the annuitant, a private
annuity probably comes within the scope of section 2036(c).5 6 Private
annuities differ from recapitalization transactions and some other estate-
freezing transactions in that the private annuity is a sale for full
consideration, if the actuarial value of the annuity equals the value of
transferred property.57 Reflecting Congress' abundance of caution, sec-
tion 2036(c) requires not only that intra-family sales have full consid-
eration, but also that transferees use their own money to make the
purchase, rather than using funds that originally came from the "estate-
freezing" transferor.5 8 While the application of the consideration rules
of section 2036(c) to private annuities is not yet clear, it seems that
using private annuities to avoid section 2036(c) will depend on the
annuity writer using her own money to make the annuity payments
rather than funds from the property transferred in exchange for the
annuity. 9 Having in mind the history, theory, and estate tax conse-
quences of annuities establishes the background necessary to explore
the long and confusing history of the income tax consequences of both
the simple commercial annuity and the more complex private annuity.
54. Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance,
77 COL. L. REv. 161, 170-177 (1977).
55. I.R.C. § 2036(c).
56. Notice 89-99, 1989-38 I.R.B. 4, 5.
57. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 42.
58. I.R.C. § 2036(c)(2).
59. Id. See also Blattmachr & Gans, An Analysis of the TAMRA Changes to the Valuation
Freeze Rules: Part 1, 70 J. TAx'N 14 (1989); Blattmachr & Gans, An Analysis of the TAMRA
Changes to the Valuation Freeze Rule: Part II, 70 J. TAX'N 74 (1989). See also Notice 89-99,
1989-38 I.R.B. 4, particularly example 24 at 41 & 53. Commentators express considerable
dissatisfaction with the present form of section 2036(c), and the section may be subject to
further amendment or repeal. Louden, Treasury Rejects Proposals to Retroactively Repeal
Estate Freeze Limits, 43 TAx No-Es 926 (1989).
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II. FEDERAL TAXATION OF ANNUITANTS BEFORE 1954
A. Treatment of Annuities Before the 1934 Act
Until the 1950's, the federal income tax treatment of the annuity
lagged decades behind actuarial science and the commercial treatment
of annuities. The science of annuities did not find a place in the
simple, early federal income tax, and Congress' first attempt, in
1934, to recognize that each annuity payment consisted of both
principal and income was a clumsy failure. The only mention of the
taxation of annuitants in the 1913 income tax law provided that
payees of life insurance and annuity contracts would receive the
amounts paid into the policies tax-free. 60
It was easy to apply the 1913 Revenue Act's language to the case
of a cashed-in life insurance policy. If the owner of a life insurance
policy received $15,000 upon cashing in the policy and had paid
$10,000 in premiums under the policy, the owner had to report
$5,000 of gross income. The application of this scheme to annuity
policies was less obvious. In 1914, income tax regulations construing
the language of the 1913 Revenue Act, required annuitants to treat
a portion of each payment as return of capital and the rest as
income.61 The approach of the 1914 regulations approximated the
results required by actuarial science and would have produced results
similar to those obtained under current annuity rules.
62
By 1915, however, the regulations and rulings construing the same
statutory language adopted a capital recovery approach. The capital
60. Revenue Act of 1913 section II(B), ch. 16, 38 Stat. 114, 167 (1913), provided as
follows: "payments made by or credited to the insured, on life insurance, endowment, or
annuity contracts, upon the return thereof to the insured at the maturity of the term mentioned
in the contract, or upon surrender of contract, shall not be included as income." Similar
language appears in section 4 of the Revenue Act of 1916, section 1200 of the Revenue Act
of 1917, section 213(b)(2) Revenue Acts of 1918, 1921, 1924, and 1926, and section 22(b)(2)
of the Revenue Acts of 1928 and 1932. For amendments in the 1926 Act to clarify the meaning
of the stated language, see infra note 73 and accompanying text. Permitting taxpayers to
recover their investment tax-free was contrary to the British approach, which treated the entire
annuity payment as income. Magill, The Income Tax Liability of Annuities and Similar
Periodical Payments, 33 YALE L.J. 229, 234-35 (1924).
61. T.D. 2090, 16 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 259, 260 (1914), cited in Meisenholder, Taxation
of Annuity Contracts under Federal Income Tax, 40 MICH. L. REv. 1005, 1007 n.8 (1942).
62. See I.R.C. § 72.
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recovery approach permitted the annuitant to receive payments tax-
free until the annuitant's investment in the contract had been com-
pletely recovered. The taxpayer then included in income all payments
received after the invested capital of the taxpayer had been recov-
ered. 63 Warner v. Walsh,64 possibly the first litigated private annuity
income tax case, followed the recovery of capital approach used by
most of the earlier rulings.65 In Warner v. Walsh, Mrs. Warner
exchanged her statutory rights in her husband's estate for an annuity
to be paid by a trust created under the will of her late husband.
66
The court treated the value of her statutory rights as the principal
paid for the annuity and allowed her to exclude the annuity payments
from income until she had recovered the value of her statutory
rights.6 1 Most early cases followed the capital recovery approach used
in Warner v. Walsh.
63
However, the Board of Tax Appeals adopted a completely different
approach in Klein v. Commissioner based upon the actuarial prin-
ciples underlying annuities. 69 Klein resulted from a dispute over an
inheritance. The taxpayer, a daughter of the decedent, agreed to give
up her claim against the estate and other heirs in exchange for an
annuity of $5,000 per year. The court valued the annuity at $57,753.50.
The court then determined that, while the statutory language required
that the taxpayer receive her investment in the contract tax-free, it
did not require that each payment be completely tax-free until the
annuitant had recovered her investment basis. Instead, the court
required the taxpayer to report each payment to be apportioned
between income and principal, intending the allocation between prin-
cipal and income reflect the "normal theory of purchased annui-
ties. "70 The Internal Revenue Service acquiesced in the Klein
63. T.D. 2152, 17 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 95, 96 (1915), cited in Meisenholder, Taxation
of Annuity Contracts under Federal Income Tax, 40 MicH. L. REv. 1005, 1007 n.8 (1942).
Most early income tax rulings reflect the return of capital approach. E.g., O.D. 170, 1 C.B.
298 (1919); T.D. 3112, 4 C.B. 1403. In at least one ruling, however, the pro rata recovery
approach was used. O.D. 1108, 5 C.B. 92 (1921), cited in Meisenholder, supra at 1007 n.8.
64. 15 F.2d 367 (2d Cir. 1926), (construing the 1917 and 1918 Revenue Acts).
65. E.g., I.T. 1484, 1-2 C.B. 66 (1922).
66. Warner v. Walsh, 15 F.2d at 368.
67. Id. at 368.
68. See, e.g., United States v. Bolster, 26 F.2d 760 (1st Cir. 1928); Allen v. Brandeis, 29
F.2d 363 (8th Cir. 1928); Continental Ill. Bank & Trust v. Blair, 45 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1930).
But see, Klein v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 617 (1927).
69. Klein v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 617 (1927). The Klein case involved the same
language, in the 1916 and 1918 Revenue Acts, construed in Warner v. Walsh.
70. Klein v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. at 622. An annuity contract may be viewed as a
stream of payments liquidating the amount originally invested in the contract. The investment
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
decision, 71 and while there was some dispute about the mathematics
employed in the Klein case, other courts followed the Klein or
"actuarial" approach.72
The Klein decision, decided in 1927, is particularly interesting when
contrasted with the new provision governing the income tax rules
applicable to life insurance and annuities in the Revenue Act of 1926.
Congress amended the life insurance and annuity rules in 1926 to
remove any possible doubt that the taxpayer must recover all con-
sideration paid for the contract before receiving any income. Section
213(b)(2) of the Revenue Act of 1926 listed as amounts excluded
from gross income:
Amounts received ... under a[n] ... annuity contract, but if such
amounts (when added to amounts received before the taxable year
under such contract) exceed the aggregate premiums or consideration
earns interest, but the amount of the payment requires that some principal, as well as the
interest, be paid even in the first year of the contract. As the principal is paid out, the amount
of interest that the remaining principal can earn is smaller for each payment, requiring the
amount of principal in each payment to increase as the annuity payments continue. Galvin,
supra note 10, at 480. Under this "actuarial" approach to taxing the income, annuitants are
treated as receiving a large amount of income in the first payment, with a small amount of
the first payment excluded as principal. Each succeeding payment includes less income and
has a larger exclusion. Using the three-year annuity at 8% annual interest discussed in the
example following note 33, the annuitant paid $2,577.10 for an annuity of $1,000 per year.
The investment will earn $206.17 of interest the first year, and the remainder of the first
$1,000 payment, $793.83, is principal. The principal remaining at the beginning of the second
year, $1,783.27, is computed by subtracting the $793.83 paid out in the first annuity payment
from the $2,577.10 original principal. The second year's payment consists of $142.66 interest
(8% interest on $1,783.27), and $857.34 of principal. After the second annuity payment,
$925.93 of principal remains ($1,783.27 - $857.34) and earns $74.07 of interest. The final
payment consists of the $925.93 principal and $74.07 interest. Under the "actuarial" approach
recommended in the Klein case, the taxpayer would have $206.17 of gross income in year one,
$142.66 of gross income in year two and $74.07 of income in year three. Under the "capital
recovery" approach of Warner, the taxpayer would have no income in years one or two and
would have $422.90 of gross income in year three.
71. VII-2 C.B. 17.
72. E.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 15 B.T.A. 20 (1929). In Guaranty Trust
Co., the decedent had exchanged property for an annuity issued by the bank. The dispute
arose after the year of the exchange. The board stated that it would have treated the transaction
as a sale in the year of the exchange, followed by a purchase of the annuity. Because only
the years after the year of the exchange were at stake, the court treated part of each payment
as ordinary income and the rest as a return of the taxpayer's investment, the fair market value
of the property traded for the annuity. Id. at 24-25.
The difference in opinion over the exact computation of return of principal and interest
arose in Commissioner v. John C. Moore Corp., 42 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1930). The John C.
Moore Corp. case involved an annuity writer rather than an annuitant, but the computational
issues were the same. The board in Klein had required that each payment be discounted back
to the date of purchase, while the Second Circuit in John C. Moore Corp. described a method
of computing the interest based on the remaining unrecovered principal and treated the
remainder of the payment as interest. John C. Moore Corp., 42 F.2d at 189. The Second
Circuit wrote that this method, rather than that of Klein, would "more nearly approach that
employed by insurance companies in their annuity calculations." Id.
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paid (whether or not paid during the taxable year) then the excess
shall be included in gross income.
73
After the passage of the 1926 Revenue Act, it was clear that the
annuitant should report annuity payments by recovering the entire
cost of the annuity before reporting any income. Any approach that
correctly reflected the actuarial science underlying annuities by treat-
ing part of each payment as income and part as principal was rejected.
B. Exchanges of Appreciated Property for Annuities
An exchange of appreciated property for a private annuity required
consideration of a different question, namely, how and when should
the gain in the appreciated property be recognized? The Board of
Tax Appeals decided the leading case involving an exchange of
property for a private annuity, Lloyd v. Commissioner,74 after the
1926 Revenue Act provisions were in effect. Unlike most of the
previous cases involving an exchange of property for an annuity, the
issue was how the gain in the property exchanged for the annuity
should be treated. Lloyd involved a sale of stock in 1930 from J.
Darsie Lloyd to his son, Harold Lloyd, the movie star, in exchange
for an annuity.
In a deferred payment sale like a private annuity, to which install-
ment sale treatment did not apply, 75 a taxpayer could either charac-
terize the sale as a closed transaction or as an open transaction. In
most cases, taxpayers had to use the characterization of a closed
transaction. Closed transaction treatment required the taxpayer to
report all of the gain from the transaction immediately. The taxpayer
had to compute the entire value of the consideration received, the
73. Revenue Act of 1926, § 213(b)(2), ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9 (1926). The rationale of the
Klein case was also undermined by a later case brought by one of her sisters, Cora Louis.
After Rosalinda Klein, mother of both the taxpayer in Klein and Mrs. Louis, died prematurely,
Mrs. Louis attempted to deduct a loss for the amount of the basis in her annuity that she
had not recovered. The board, reasoning that annuities were streams of payments that could
be valued, allowed a deduction for the unrecovered basis. Louis v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A.
1200 (1934). On appeal, the circuit court, however, relied on the 1926 amendments to the
Revenue Act to require that a recovery of capital approach be applied to annuities. Using a
recovery of capital approach, Louis had received total payments in excess of the cost of her
annuity, and therefore was not entitled to a deduction. Helvering v. Louis, 77 F.2d 386 (D.C.
Cir. 1935).
74. 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936), nonacq. XV-2 C.B. 39 (1936), nonacq. withdrawn and acq.
1950-2 C.B. 3.
75. See infra note 247 and accompanying text.
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amount realized, 76 and subtract the adjusted basis of the property
from the amount realized to find the gain." The entire gain would
be reported in the year of the exchange. In unusual cases in which
the uncertain value of the consideration received made it impossible
to value the amount realized, however, the taxpayer could use open
transaction treatment, reporting gain from the transaction only when
the payments received exceeded the adjusted basis of the property
sold in the deferred payment sale.78 In Lloyd, the Board of Tax
Appeals found that the uncertainties inherent in the transaction
required that the annuitant treat the payments as an open transaction
under Burnet v. Logan.79 There were two major sources of uncertainty
in Lloyd, the annuitant's uncertain life span and the risk that the
annuity writer would be unable to make all the payments. The Board
relied primarily on the annuity writer's potential inability to pay.
The Board particularly contrasted the ability to value an annuity
granted by an insurance company, with large resources and with its
investment practices regulated by law, against that of an individual,
with the freedom to make risky investments that could lead to
insolvency. 0 A later case determined that the gain from exchanging
appreciated property for a private annuity was ordinary income.8'
Even though the Board did not rely on the annuity rules, its
treatment of the gain in the Lloyd transaction was consistent with
the income tax consequences of annuities. The Code provisions
applicable to an ordinary annuity permitted the annuitant to treat
the payments, in effect, as an open transaction. 2 The annuitant
treated the annuity payments as a tax-free return of capital until the
annuitant recovered the cost of the annuity. After the annuitant
recovered the cost of the annuity, all subsequent payments under the
annuity contract were ordinary income.83
A ruling issued by the Internal Revenue Service before the Lloyd
case was decided shows just how important the uncertainties sur-
rounding the annuity writer's ability to pay could be. In Gen. Couns.
76. See IR.C. § 1001(b).
77. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
78. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1931). For a more complete explanation of open
transaction treatment, see Ginsburg, Future Payment, supra note 10, at 559-562.
79. Lloyd, 33 B.T.A. at 905.
80. Id,
81. Ware v. Commissioner, 159 F.2d 542 (5th Cir. 1947). See Ross, The Private Annuity
as a Tax Minimizing Instrument, 41 TAxEs 199, 207 (1973).
82, R. MoNTaomRY, FEDERAL Iitco?,m TAx HANDBOOK 1935-1936 62 (1935).
83. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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Mem. 1002,84 the taxpayer transferred an apartment building to a
corporation for a single-life annuity of $12x per year, to be paid in
monthly installments. The Bureau of Internal Revenue ruled that the
transaction should be closed and that all gain be taxed in the year
that the corporation issued the annuity. The Service ruled that the
annuity should be valued using tables in the regulations. The value
of the annuity would be treated as the amount realized, and the
difference between the amount realized and the adjusted basis should
be recognized as gain in the year the annuity was issued.85 The
taxpayer could then treat the present value of the annuity at the time
of the exchange as the principal sum to be recovered tax-free under
the annuity rules. After the principal sum had been recovered in full,
the taxpayer would have ordinary income from all subsequent pay-
ments. 6 In contrast, the courts came to assume that no private
annuity written by an individual had an ascertainable fair market
value, thus requiring open transaction treatment.
8 7
Gen. Couns. Mem. 1002 was also important for another reason.
Unlike the Lloyd case and most other annuity cases, it recognized
that a private annuity exchanged for appreciated property involved
two distinct sources of income for the annuitant, (1) the gain in the
appreciated property, and (2), the interest element common to an-
nuities.
While the tax consequences for annuitants were generally favorable
for those who outlived their life expectancies and those who trans-
ferred appreciated property in exchange for annuities, it was generally
unfavorable for those suffering economic or mortality losses. An-
nuitants who purchased annuities and who failed to live out their
life expectancies could not deduct as losses the amount of their
unrecovered premiums.88 The courts relied on several approaches in
denying losses to disadvantaged annuitants. First, the courts held
that, because an annuitant had received the security of continuing
payments, the annuitant suffered no loss if the payments terminated
prematurely. 89 Second, most courts would not admit that a loss had
occurred until the payments had ended, and the court could compare
84. Gen. Couns. Mem. 1002, VI-I C.B. 12 (1927).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Commissioner v. Kann's Estate, 174 F.2d 357 (3d Cir. 1949), cited in Ross, The
Private Annuity as a Tax Minimizing Instrument, 41 TAxEs 199, 205 n.32 (1963).
88. Industrial Trust Co. v. Broderick, 94 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1938).
89. Id.
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the total payments received to the basis of the property given up. 9
Third, the courts denied the loss deduction because the transaction
was not entered into for profit. 9' Finally, the use of the recovery of
capital approach to taxing annuities had the effect of accelerating
the taxpayer's recovery of basis. The sooner the basis was recovered,
the less likely the taxpayer was to have a loss and the smaller that
loss was likely to be. 92
C. Treatment of Annuities After the 1934 Reform
Another revision of the statutory treatment of annuities in 1934
had the effect of requiring courts to make a more complete analysis
of private annuities. The 1934 Revenue Act for the first time set
forth a specific rule for taxing only annuities, and the rules were
aimed at reducing the perceived tax benefits of annuities. Before the
1934 revision, only annuitants who lived long enough to recover all
of the capital invested in the annuity had income. Although annui-
tants who died before receiving all of their capital back received no
deduction, they also had no income. 93 Congress found that the former
provisions had been abused. High income taxpayers had used the
return of capital approach to taxing annuities to defer substantial
amounts of tax.94 Because of the tax avoidance possibilities, and
90. Helvering v. Louis, 77 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Deering v. Commissioner, 40
B.T.A. 984 (1939); Hommel v. Commissioner, 7 T.C. 992 (1946).
91. Industrial Trust Co. v. Broderick, 94 F.2d 927 (1st Cir. 1938).
92. Helvering v. Louis, 77 F.2d 386 (D.C. Cir. 1935). Mrs. Louis had computed her
income or loss by treating each payment as consisting of partly a return of capital and partly
income. Louis v. Commissioner, 29 B.T.A. 1200 (1934). This was consistent with the tax
treatment required of her sister by Klein and was upheld by the Board. (See supra note 69
for discussion of Klein). On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the proper
method for recovering principal was to recover all of the principal before having to report
any income. Because Mrs. Louis had already received payments in excess of her basis, she
had no loss. Helvering v. Louis, 77 F.2d at 388.
93. Revenue Act of 1934: Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 123 (1934) (statement of Byron K. Elliott, Manager and General Counsel,
American Life Convention).
94. 78 CONG. REc. 5911 (1934) (comments of Sen. Reed). The Senator posed the example
of a rich taxpayer who invests one million dollars in an annuity. Reed explained that "[M]any
rich men, with their fortunes in cash form, or easily convertible into cash, have resorted to
[annuities], because, obviously, not until 10, 15, or perhaps 20 years after the transaction was
entered into would they begin to pay income tax; and when they did, it would be treated as
a capital gain, I take it, and they would be taxed at a reduced rate on the theory that they
had made this capital investment years before and were now realizing a capital gain from the
subsequent payments." Id.
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because taxpayers seemed to be investing larger amounts of money
in annuities, 95 Congress changed the annuity rules to prevent income
taxes from being "postponed indefinitely. "96
The 1934 Act required annuitants to include in each year's gross
income three percent of the total consideration paid for an annuity.
97
The 1934 rules treated the remainder of each year's annuity payment
as a tax-free return of capital until the consideration paid for the
annuity had been recovered tax-free.98 When the annuitant had ex-
cluded the entire amount of the consideration paid for the annuity
from gross income, the entire annuity payment became taxable.9 9 The
congressional drafters intended the "three percent" ordinary income
portion of each payment to approximate the return that an annuitant
might receive over a normal lifetime on the investment in the an-
nuity.00
While the "three-percent rule" recognized that annuity payments
consisted of both interest and return of principal, the rules still varied
widely from the economic realities of annuities. The choice of an
"arbitrary" percentage was, of course, bound to be inaccurate in
many cases.10' Even if the three-percent return figure established at
the enactment of the legislation was accurate, 02 the fixed percentage
was doomed to become inaccurate as time and investment rates
inevitably changed. Also, any system that provides for a constant
sum of interest and a constant sum of principal in each payment
ignores the realities of present value. The principal sum on deposit
is larger in the early years and earns more interest to be paid out,
while in later years, the amount of interest paid out is smaller and
the amount of principal is larger. 03
95. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934). Industry representatives argued,
among other things, that an average annuitant received only very small amounts, $430 per
year, and that the revenue losses were not so great as perceived by Congress. Revenue Act of
1934: Hearings on H.R. 7835 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 122
(1934) (Brief of Henry Moir, President of the U. S. Life Ins. Co.).
96. H.R. Rep. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934).
97. Revenue Act of 1934, ch. 277 § 22(b)(2), 48 Stat. 680, 687 (1934).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. H.R. REp. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1934).
101. Id.
102. At least one commentator claimed that the real rate of return on most annuities was
only 1 1/2% and that Congress was, in effect, unconstitutionally taxing capital rather than
income. Note, Income Tax on Annuities, 11 TEmp. L.Q. 567, 568-9 (1937).
103. Hearings on the Revenue Act of 1934 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance, 73d
Cong., 2d. Sess. 117 (1934) (Brief of Roger B. Hull, for the Nat. Ass'n of Life Underwriters).
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D. Exchanges of Property for Annuities-1934 Act
Application of the provisions of the 1934 Revenue Act to the
exchange of property for a private annuity required the taxpayers to
differentiate return of basis, gain from capital appreciation, and
ordinary income under the new three-percent rule. No previous case
or administrative pronouncement had required such a complex or
complete treatment of the private annuity transaction. The early cases
only dealt with the application of the three-percent factor.'14 The
decisions consistently required the annuity contracts to be valued
according to insurance company annuity tables, because the taxpayers
had often made disguised gifts in purchasing private annuities from
charities or related parties. 05 The three-percent factor was then
multiplied by the actuarial value of the annuity contracts to find the
ordinary income element.'06
The first case to deal with the complete problem of ordinary
income, return of basis, and gain was Hill's Estate v. Maloney,0 7
decided in 1944. The unfortunate solution reached by the court
required double taxation of the annuity payments. 08 In Hill's Estate,
the annuitant sold a large block of stock in the corporation he had
founded to a syndicate composed of two of his sons and three other
trusted employees of the corporation. The syndicate members paid
for the stock with both cash and a non-refundable, single-life annuity.
In deciding how the gain in the stock should be recognized, the court
applied the open transaction rule to the annuity, following Lloyd
and its progeny. Under the open transaction method, the annuitant
would recover his basis fully before having to pay tax on the
appreciation in the stock he had transferred. 0 9 The court then applied
the new three-percent rule to the transaction to allocate between the
"interest" portion of each annuity payment and the "principal"
portion. For this purpose, the court viewed the transaction as though
104. Kann's Estate v. Commissioner, 1947 P-H T.C. Memo. 47,226, aff'd 174 F.2d 357
(3rd Cir. 1948); Gillespie v. Commissioner, 43 B.T.A. 399 (1941), acq. 1941-1 C.B. 5, aff'd
114 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1940); Raymond v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 244 (1939), acq. 1939-2
C.B. 31, aff'd. 114 F.2d 140 (7th Cir. 1940); Steenburg v. Commissioner, P-H B.T.A. Memo.
41,184.
105. Raymond v. Commissioner, 40 B.T.A. 244 (1939).
106. Id.
107. 58 F. Supp. 164, 175 (D.N.J. 1944).
108. Galvin, supra note 10, at 490-491.
109. Hill's Estate v. Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164, 171-172.
1990 / Taxation of Exchanges of Property for Private Annuities
the taxpayer had sold his stock and then purchased an annuity. If
the taxpayer had sold the property and then purchased an annuity,
two gains would have been recognized, one on the sale and another
on receipt of the annuity payments. 10 Therefore, the court determined
that three percent of the consideration paid for the annuities should
be treated as gross income in each taxable year. In applying both
the principles of the Lloyd case and the three-percent rule to the
facts of the case, however, the court made its mistake. The court
reduced Mr. Hill's basis by the entire amount of each annuity
payment, including the amount included in income under the three-
percent rule. Instead, the court should have subtracted the three-
percent "interest" component from each payment first. After the
"principal" element of each payment had thus been determined, the
court should have reduced Mr. Hill's basis in his stock only by the
"principal" portion of each payment."' The court also erred by
treating both sorts of income as capital gain.
112
The Internal Revenue Service finally reconciled how the "three-
percent rule" and open transaction treatment should be applied to a
private annuity. Revenue Ruling 239113 described a familiar private
annuity transaction. The annuitant exchanged real estate with a fair
market value of $40,000 and an adjusted basis of $5,600 for a private
annuity of $2,000 per year. The Service first applied the three-percent
rule to the fair market value of the consideration paid for the annuity,
the $40,000 real estate, to produce $1,200 of ordinary income, the
interest element, in each year's payment. The Service then treated
the remaining $800 in each payment as principal under the Lloyd
case. The taxpayer would be able to treat the $800 per year as tax-
free return of principal for seven years until the adjusted basis of
the property was recovered tax-free, and as capital gain until the
$40,000 fair market value of the real estate was recovered in fifty
years. After that, each annuity payment would be ordinary income."
4
The annuity provisions enacted by the 1934 Revenue Act, unlike
previous statutory provisions, recognized, albeit clumsily, that each
annuity payment consisted of both income and the return of the
annuitant's investment. The Lloyd case had held that the gain in
appreciated property exchanged for a private annuity should be
110. Id. at 174.
111. Galvin, supra note 10, at 490-491.
112. Hill's Estate v. Malor.ey, 58 F. Supp. 164, 178-79.
113. Rev. Rul. 239, 1953-2 C.B. 53.
114. Id.
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treated as an open transaction because of the uncertain ability of an
individual annuity writer to make the annuity payments. Reconciling
these principles proved difficult, but in 1953, Revenue Ruling 239
provided a comprehensive scheme for combining the rules of the
Lloyd case and the three-percent rule for taxing annuitants in private
annuity transactions.
III. TREATMENT OF ANNUrTY WRITERS BEFORE THE 1954 CODE
The inconsistencies of tax treatment for annuitants carried over to
writers of private annuities, the buyers of property from the annui-
tants.' The two most important issues to annuity writers are (1)
what is the basis in the property acquired in exchange for the annuity,
and (2) whether the annuity writer can deduct any portion of the
annuity payments as interest. The courts developed two schools of
thought in resolving the two issues.
A few early decisions adopted the "venture" theory of private
annuities, applying the concepts used in commercial annuities."16
These courts, basing their analysis on an analogy to commercial
annuities, computed the actuarial value of the annuity at the time of
the exchange and used that as the annuity writer's basis in her
property."17 The theory of commercial annuities also recognizes that
the time value of money, or interest, is a part of each annuity
payment, and so courts following the venture approach allowed
annuity writers an interest deduction."'
The majority of decisions, and particularly the later cases, adopt
a "capital expenditure" approach to the treatment of annuity wri-
ters."19 Under this approach, the courts viewed the annuity writer as
merely acquiring property for a series of capital investments. Under
the capital expenditure approach, the "interest" element of each
annuity payment is treated as a capital expenditure. Instead, each
annuity payment is merely another addition to the basis of the
115. For excellent reviews of the pre-1954 cases and rulings on the tax consequences of
annuity writers, see Davey, Property Exchanged for a Promise to Pay an Annuity-Transferee
Problems, 33 TAx.s 494 (1955); Meyer, Transfer of Property for an Annuity-Tax Position
of the Transferee, 31 TAxEs 645 (1953); and Galvin, infra note 116.
116. Galvin, Income Tax Consequences of Agreements Involving Non-Commercial Annu-
ities, 29 Tex. L. Rev. 469, 491-506 (1951).
117. Id. at 504.
118. Id. at 493.
119. Steinbach Kresge Co. v. Sturgess, 33 F. Supp. 897, 898 (D.N.J. 1940).
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acquired property, which slowly builds up as the annuity writer
makes annuity payments.
120
Courts intended to make the tax consequences of private annuities
for annuitants and annuity writers consistent. The early decisions,
like Florence Klein,12 1 that applied the theory of commercial annuities
to the taxation of annuitants were consistent with the cases that
applied the "annuity venture" approach to annuity writers. 22 On the
other hand, decisions that used an open transaction model for the
annuitant were consistent with decisions that applied the capital
expenditure approach to annuity writers. Therefore, the capital ex-
penditure approach soon triumphed over the annuity venture ap-
proach in determining the tax treatment of annuity writers.1
23
A. Basis of Property Acquired by the Annuity Writer
The earliest decision dealing with the basis problem is Steinbach
Co. v. Commissioner'2 4 in 1926. In order to shift control of his
corporation to his two sons, the taxpayer transferred all of his
common stock and over half of his preferred stock in the Steinbach
Co. to the corporation in exchange for an annuity. The Board of
Tax Appeals was asked to determine the proper cost of the treasury
stock entered on the books of the corporation. Using available
mortality tables, the Board computed the number of expected pay-
ments. The Board then multiplied the number of expected payments
by the amount of each payment to establish the price of the treasury
stock. The Board then decided that any "actual expenditures in
excess of the above estimate" be added to the cost of the treasury
stock. 2 1
Although the Board's decision reflects some parts of an annuity
venture approach to the basis problem, the Board's solution really
reflects a simple, capital expenditure view of the annuity transac-
tion.2 6 While the Board permitted the taxpayer to treat an estimate
120. Id.
121. Klein v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 617 (1927).
122. Galvin, supra note 116, at 491-506. The court in Commissioner v. John C. Moore
Corp., 42 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1930), relied heavily upon the Klein decision.
123. Galvin, supra note 116, at 491-506.
124. Steinbach C. v. Commissioner, 3 B.T.A. 348 (1926).
125. Id. at 354.
126. An early I.R.S. ruling denied the annuity writer any interest deduction. I.T. 1242, I-
I C.B. 61 (1922). All payments had to be capitalized until the total reached the actuarial value
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
of the total expected payments to be used as basis, an approach
consistent with the annuity venture theory, the Board's analysis was
too simple. The Board included no interest element or discount for
the time value of money. In addition, the Board permitted the
taxpayer to increase basis by amounts expended in excess of the
court's original estimate of basis. Therefore, the Board treated the
basis as an investment in installments without interest, even though
the BoArd was willing to give the annuity writer's basis a head start,
beginning with the present value of the annuity payments as the
writer's original basis.
A later decision systematically applied the actuarial principles of
annuities, the annuity venture approach, to determine the basis of
the real estate acquired in exchange for an annuity. In John C.
Moore Corp. v. Commissioner,127 Hattie Moore transferred buildings
that the corporation had occupied under a lease to the corporation
in exchange for an annuity. The Board determined that the proper
basis was the present value of the annuity at the time of transfer.
The court pointed out that each payment must be discounted to
present value, reflecting the time value of money. Only after each
expected payment over the life expectancy of the annuitant had been
discounted could they be added together to provide a basis in the
buildings.'28 The Board's decision correctly reflected the economics
of annuities.
Most of the courts, however, determined the annuity writer's basis
on a "capital expenditure" basis, by just adding up the total of
payments made to the annuitant. 2 9 Most courts denied the annuity
writer even an initial, estimated basis determined by the life expec-
tancy of the annuitant. Instead, the cases required the annuity writer
to begin with no basis and to increase the basis of acquired property
by the amount of each payment as it was made. 30
B. Revenue Ruling 55-119
Because they could only decide the narrow question before them,
court decisions provided guidance on only a few of the possible
of the annuity. The ruling then allowed the annuity writer to deduct payments in excess of
the actuarial value of the annuity as a loss. Later rulings, however, required buyers in a
private annuity to treat all payments made to the annuitant as capital expenditures. I.T. 1662,
11-1 C.B. 121 (1923).
127. 15 B.T.A. 1140 (1929), aff'd 42 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1930).
128. John C. Moore Corp., 15 B.T.A. 1140, 1144.
129. Galvin, supra note 116, at 496.
130. Steinbach Kresge Co. v. Sturgess, 33 F. Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1940).
1990 / Taxation of Exchanges of Property for Private Annuities
problems faced by a taxpayer needing to calculate the basis of
property acquired in exchange for a private annuity. Only a ruling
or regulation, which could consider several variations on a represen-
tative problem, could illustrate how the basis of property should be
computed. The Service's eventual solution to the basis problem was
a ruling designed to be a comprehensive answer to questions of basis
in property acquired for private annuities. 3 1 The ruling was founded
upon the notion that the basis should be the total amounts paid by
the annuity writer to the annuitant.132 The taxpayer was permitted to
use actuarial values to approximate the value of the annuity, however,
when adding up the payments produced unworkable results.133
1. General Rules for Figuring Basis
Reflecting the capital expenditure theory as the fundamental ap-
proach of the ruling, the basis of a non-depreciable property sold
after the death of the annuitant was the sum of the payments made
to the annuitant under the annuity. 34 Using the annual amounts paid
under the annuity as the basis of the acquired property for depreci-
ation purposes, however, would be difficult to administer. 135 The
ruling, therefore, established the actuarial value of the annuity,
determined according to the tables in the Regulations, as the basis
of the acquired property for purposes of computing depreciation.
36
However, the ruling required the annuity writer, after the decedent's
death, to revise the property's depreciation schedule to conform to
the sum of annuity payments actually made. 37
131. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-2 C.B. 352 (hereafter Rev. Rul. 55-119) (construing the
provisions of the 1939 Code).
132. Id. at 353.
133. The actuarial value was used for computing depreciation, and for computing gain
when the annuity writer transferred the property while the annuitant was still alive. Id. at 353,
354.
134. Id. at 354.
135. Compare another example of contingent purchase price, the depreciation of patents.
Patents being acquired for royalties based upon the income from the patent involve similar
uncertain payments. The royalties paid by the purchasers are treated as the annual amount of
depreciation. Associated Patentees, Inc. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 979 (1944). The royalties,
however, will only be paid for the life of the patent, and the royalties are related to the value
of the patent. In the case of property acquired for a private annuity, however, the amount
which may be paid depends on the life of the annuitant. The only time at which the annuity's
value and the value of the property will certainly correspond is at the date of grant. After
that, the life of the annuitant and the total paid for the property may have nothing to do
with the value or economic life of the property. Therefore, an approach like that used in
patent cases is inappropriate.
136. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-2 C.B. 352, 353.
137. Id. at 354.
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The ruling's example illustrates how the general principles of the
ruling should be applied. The ruling involved the purchase of land
worth $15,000 and a building worth $80,000 for an annuity of $10,000
per year with a present value of $94,785. The basis of the land and
building, for purposes of computing depreciation, was $94,785. Based
upon this value, the building was depreciated on a straight-line basis
at $1,296 per year (assuming a fifty-year life and $15,000 salvage
value).138 At the death of the annuitant, however, the depreciation
schedule would be corrected to reflect the annuity payments actually
made. In the example, the annuitant died after eight years, and
$80,000 in payments had been made, requiring the annuity writer to
reduce the amount of annual depreciation taken to $999.94 to reflect
the lower basis of the property.3 9
2. Dispositions During the Annuitant's Life
Finally, the ruling provided for two different bases for property
sold during the life of the annuitant, one for determining gain and
another for determining loss. For purposes of computing loss, the
basis of the property was the sum of the annuity payments made up
to the date of disposition.14° For purposes of determining gain,
however, the ruling required the seller to add the total payments
already made to the actuarial value of the expected payments to be
made on the annuity, computed using the tables in the Regulations
based on the annuitant's life expectancy at the date of the disposition
of the property. 41 If the amount realized on the sale of the property
was less than the basis for gain purposes but more than the basis
for loss purposes, the annuity writer would recognize neither gain
nor loss on the sale.
142
A simple example, based in part on the example in the ruling,
shows how the dual basis rule applies in practice. If we assume that
138. Id. at 355. The formula was [S80,000 (value of bldg.)/$95,000 (value of bldg. plus
land)] times [$94,785 (value of annuity) - $15,000 (salvage value)] to produce the portion of
the basis attributable to the building that could be depreciated. The resulting figure was divided
by 50 (the useful life of the building) to produce the depreciation deduction. Id.
139. Id. at 355. The new formula for depreciation would be: [$80,000 (value of the
building)/$95,000 (value of the land and building)] times [$80,000 (total payments made to
the annuitant) - $15,000 (salvage value) - $10,371.04 (depreciation already taken). The result,
the amount of the building's basis available for depreciation would be divided by 42 years
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the property was a capital asset, and that it was sold after nine years
of payments had been made, the basis for purposes of determining
loss would be $90,000, the sum of the payments made before the
sale. The basis for purposes of determining gain would be $90,000
(the payments made), plus the value of the annuity for the annuitant
(age seventy-eight at the date of sale), $63,705, for a total of
$153,705.14 A sale for less than $90,000 would produce an immediate
loss. A sale for $90,000 to $153,705 would produce neither gain nor
loss, and a sale for more than $153,705 would produce a gain.
3. Basis Adjustments after Disposition
Because the annuity writer would still be liable to make payments
after disposing of the property, however, events occurring after the
disposition of the property could affect the gain or loss on the sale
of the property. If the annuitant recognized a loss on the sale, for
example, all payments made after the disposition of the property
would constitute an additional loss in the years paid.144 A gain or
loss could also occur in a case in which the annuity writer recognized
no loss on the original disposition of the property. If the payments
to the annuitant eventually exceeded the amount realized on the sale,
each dollar paid to the annuitant in excess of the amount realized
would be loss recognized at the time the excess payments were made,
but characterized by the disposition of the property.145 If the total
amounts eventually paid to the annuitant were less than the amount
realized on the disposition of the property, however, the annuity
writer would recognize gain in the year of the annuitant's death. In
situations in which gain was originally recognized, gain or loss could
eventually result, depending on whether the total amount eventually
paid to the annuitant was greater or less than the gain basis originally
used on disposition of the property. 146
4. Evaluation of Revenue Ruling 55-119
The ruling prescribes a thorough and generally reasonable proce-
dure for determining basis in private annuity sales. The ruling is
143. Id. at 355-56.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 354-355.
146. Id.
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complex, both in concept and in use, but taxpayers with enough
property to make such a transaction attractive will need, and can
probably afford, competent counsel able to find and apply these
complex rules. Revenue Ruling 55-119 also has weaknesses that are
not immediately apparent. For example, one can imagine a situation
in which an annuitant's life expectancy was longer than the period
used to depreciate the acquired property. Assume that the annuitant
with a life expectancy of fifteen years sold five-year class property
to her nephew in exchange for a private annuity. If the actuarial
determined value of the annuity were $10,000, then the nephew
would have claimed $10,000 of depreciation deductions by the end
of year six and the adjusted basis of the property would be zero. If
the annuitant then died in the seventh year, Revenue Ruling 55-119
would require the nephew to reduce his basis to the sum of payments
actually made, and that amount could be less than the original basis
used by the nephew to compute depreciation. The nephew would
have a negative basis in the property. 47 The ideal solution would be
to have the nephew recapture the excess depreciation taken as income
in the year the annuitant died, but this could not be required without
an amendment to the Code.
1 48
The court rulings deciding how annuity writers should determine
the basis of property acquired in exchange for private annuities
initially flirted with the "venture theory" of annuities, relying on
the mathematical theory underlying annuities. The later court deci-
sions, however, settled on a capital expenditure theory for the pro-
perty's basis, requiring annuity writers to use the sum of payments
made as the basis of property acquired for a private annuity. Revenue
Ruling 55-119 finally rationalized the inconsistent analysis of the
cases and filled in the gaps in the applicable court decisions. The
ruling provided a complete and detailed scheme under many circum-
stances for determining the basis of property acquired for a private
annuity, and it is still in use, thirty-four years later.
C. Interest Deduction
The development of the law governing interest deductions for
annuity writers reached the same result as that described above for
147. Zaritsky, The Use of Private Annuities in Estate Planning: Problems, Opportunities,
and a Viable Alternative, 32 S.C.L. REv. 359, 366 n.29 (1980).
148. Id.
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basis issues, a capital expenditure theory of annuities. The reasoning
of the interest cases, however, differed somewhat from the reasoning
in the basis cases.
Interest is usually defined as "compensation for the use or for-
bearance of money.' 1 49 As the previous discussion indicates, the
valuation of annuities and their computation reflects primarily two
factors, the life expectancy of the annuitant and the interest to be
earned by the principal sum deposited in exchange for the annuity. 150
Most of the cases and rulings, however, have refused to allow
annuity writers to deduct as interest any portion of the amounts paid
to an annuitant. The Internal Revenue Bureau began the trend of
denying the interest deduction in a 1922 ruling,"' and the case law
has generally followed this trend. The circumlocutions used by some
judges to deny taxpayers the interest deduction make clear how
difficult it is to deny that annuities contain an interest component.
One court, denying that the three percent ordinary income component
required by the 1934 tax legislation was interest, stated that the
ordinary income was "not interest in the ordinary sense of that term,
but a return on capital in the nature of interest. ' 1 52
The Board of Tax Appeals in Edwin Klein,53 deciding whether an
annuity writer deserved an interest deduction, had to contradict its
holding in a previous decision. The Board had already decided in
Florence Klein1 54 that the annuitant under the same annuity contract
had received ordinary income in the nature of interest. The theory
of the Florence Klein case was that each annuity payment had to be
discounted to account for the time value of money, and that the
discount was interest. 55 The Board quoted a portion of the Black's
Law Dictionary definition of discount as " ... the taking of interest
in advance."'156 In the Edwin Klein case, the Board attempted to
distinguish its previous holding in Florence Klein. To perform this
feat of rhetorical gymnastics, the Board then stated that the term
"discount" "is not used in the instant proceeding" in the sense of
149. Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 498 (1940).
150. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
151. I.T. 1242, I-1 C.B. 61 (1922).
152. F. A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 913, 918 (10th Cir. 1946).
153. Klein v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 910 (1934).
154. Klein v Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 617 (1927). See supra note 69 and accompanying
text.
155. Klein v. Commissioner, 6 B.T.A. 617.
156. BLAcK's LAW Dicno'INAR (3d ed.) quoted in Klein v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 910,
919.
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interest, without explaining how interest for one party in a transaction
could not be interest for the other party in the same transaction.
7
Much of the failure to recognize discount as interest resulted from
the simple conception of interest embedded in the early income tax
case law. In Old Colony R.R. v. Commissioner,"' the Commissioner
had attempted to reduce the taxpayer's interest deduction by a pro
rata share of the company's bond premium. After explaining how
investors took bond premium into account in figuring their return
on investment, Justice Roberts construed the term "interest" to
denote a somewhat over-simplified, common meaning. The court
defined interest as "the amount so denominated in bond and cou-
pon," and rejected any expansion of the definition to "some esoteric
concept derived from subtle and theoretic [sic] analysis."'' 9 The
absence of a stated principal sum and stated interest rate was the
most common reason for disallowing interest deductions in pre-1954
private annuity cases. 160
The tax rules governing private annuities before 1954 did not
reflect the economic principles underlying annuities. Annuitants were
required to recognize a portion of each payment as ordinary income,
similar to interest. To compute the ordinary income component, the
annuitant multiplied three percent by the actuarial value of the
annuity contract at the time of its acquisition. 6' The three-percent
rule applied even though the rate of return on the annuity contract
might be quite different from three percent. The annuitant in a
private annuity treated the remaining "principal" portion of each
annuity payment as a tax-free return of basis until the basis of the
property exchanged had been recovered. The principal portion of
any remaining payments were treated as gain from the sale of the
property. Annuity writers, however, were treated as paying only
principal, not interest, in exchange for the property they acquired.
157. Klein v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 910, 919.
158. Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552 (1932).
159. Id. at 561.
160. F.A. Gillespie & Sons Co. v. Commissioner, 154 F.2d 913 (10th Cir. 1946); Corbett
Inv. Co. v. Helvering, 75 F.2d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1935); Steinbach Kresge Co. v. Sturgess, 33 F.
Supp. 897 (D.N.J. 1940); Reliable Incubator & Brooder Co. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C. 919
(1946); Klein v. Commissioner, 31 B.T.A. 910, 916 (1934). One reason for denying a deduction
for interest was that the income tax statutes during this period allowed deductions for "interest
paid or accrued . .. on indebtedness," (Revenue Act of 1924 § 214(a)(2)), and the courts
found no conventional indebtedness upon which interest was being paid. See, e.g., Klein v.
Commissioner, 31 B:T.A. at 918-919.
161. I.R.C. 1939, § 22(b)(2) (1939).
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IV. TREAT MNT OF PRIVATE ANNUITANTS UNDER THE 1954 CODE
A. General Taxation of Annuitants In Section 72
As a part of the general revision of the federal tax laws in 1954,
Congress enacted a new scheme for taxing annuities in section 72 of
the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. 162 Rather than imposing a statutory
rate of return for annuity contracts, the new statutory scheme de-
pended only on the terms of the contract and the annuitant's life
expectancy. Thus section 72 allow a more individualized treatment
of annuity transactions. Section 72 required each taxpayer to divide
each payment received between tax-exempt return of principal and
ordinary income. 163 Computing the exempt portion of each payment
required application of a formula:
Investment in the Contract x Payment Received/Expected Return
from the Contract.' 64
162. I.R.C. § 72(a)-(c) (1954).
163. The relevant portions of Internal Revenue Code section 72(a)-(c) (1954) provided as
follows:
§ 72. Annuities; certain proceeds of endowment and life insurance contracts
(a) General rule for annuities.-Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, gross
income includes any amount received as an annuity (whether for a period certain or
during one or more lives) under an annuity, endowment, or life insurance contract.
(b) Exclusion ratio.-Gross income does not include that part of any amount
received as an annuity under an annuity, endowment or life insurance contract which
bears the same ratio to such amount as the investment in the contract (as of the
annuity starting date) bears to the expected return under the contract (as of such
date). This subsection shall not apply to any amount to which subsection (d)(1)
(relating to certain employee annuities) applies.
(c) Definitions.-
(1) Investment in the contract.- For purposes of subsection (b), the investment in
the contract as of the annuity starting date is-
(A) the aggregate amount of premiums or other consideration paid for the contract,
minus
(B) the aggregate amount received under the contract before such date, to the
extent that such amount was excluded from gross income under this subtitle or prior
income tax laws.
(3) Expected return.-For purposes of subsection (b), the expected return under
the contract shall be determined as follows:
(A) Life expectancy.-If the expected return under the contract, for the period on
and after the annuity starting date, depends in whole or in part on the life expectancy
of one or more individuals, the expected return shall be computed with reference to
actuarial tables prescribed by the Secretary or his delegate.
I.R.C. § 72.(a)-(c) (1954).
164. I.R.C. § 72(b) (1954). The House had passed a proposal to adopt annuity rules similar
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The investment in the contract was the amount of consideration
paid for the contract, for instance, the premiums paid under a
conventional annuity contract from an insurance company. 65 The
taxpayer computed the expected return from the contract by multi-
plying the annual payment under the contract by the life expectancy
of the annuitant.'6 The Code required all annuitants to use life
expectancy tables promulgated by the Treasury Department. 167 Some-
what more complex calculations were required in cases involving
annuities on more than one life or annuities with refund features.
16
In treating the risk of mortality, however, the 1954 Code treated
annuitants as a population rather than as individuals. Once computed,
the exclusion ratio for each annuity was fixed. 69 Annuitants who
outlived their life expectancies continued to receive the benefit of
excluding a portion of the payments received, while annuitants who
died before recovering all of their capital received no deduction.' 71
B. Congressional Background of Section 72
Both the American Law InstituteM71 and the House of
Representatives 72 had recommended comprehensive approaches to
to those of the 1954 Code in 1948, but the proposal died in the Senate. H.R. 6712, 80th
Cong., 2d Sess. § 104(a) (1948).
165. I.R.C. § 72(c)(1) (1954).
166. I.R.C. § 72(c)(3) (1954). An illustration of the operation of the general rules section
72 follows: Aunt Anne, age 79, purchases an annuity of $15,000 per year for $100,000 from
the Incredibly Reliable Insurance Company. The first step is to compute Anne's expected
return by multiplying the annual payment under the annuity, $15,000, by Anne's expected
return multiple of 10.0 (from Treas. Reg. § 1.72-9, Table V, T.D. 8115, 1987-1 C.B 22, 39).
I.R.C. § 72(c)(3)(A). Anne has an expected return of $150,000. Next Anne's tax preparer
computes the exclusion ratio, by dividing Anne's investment in the contract, $100,000, by her
expected return, $150,000, for an exclusion ratio of 2/3 or .6667. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4(a)(1)(i),
T.D. 6211, 1956-2 C.B. 29, 36. Anne's tax preparer multiplies the exclusion ratio, .6667, by
the total amount received under the annuity during the tax year, $15,000, for an exclusion
from gross income of $10,000. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4(a)(1)(ii), T.D. 624, 1956-2 C.B. 29, 37.
Finally, Anne subtracts her exclusion, $10,000, from the total she received during the year
under the annuity, $15,000, to yield gross income from the annuity of $5,000. I.R.C. § 72(a),
(b)(1) (1954).
167. I.R.C. § 72(c)(3) (1954).
168. I.R.C. § 72(c)(2), (c)(3)(A).
169. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4(a)(4), T.D. 6211, 1956-2 C.B. 29, 37. The exclusion ratio could
not be used if the contract were transferred for valuable consideration, were redeemed, or
were exchanged. Id.
170. 2 TAx REFoRi ACT OF 1986, CONFERENCE REPORT TO AccoinPANY H.R. 3838, H.R.
REP No. 99-841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-459 (1986).
171. FEDERAL INCo mE TAx STATuTE § X126(f)(1)(A) (February, 1954, Draft).
172. H.R. CoNF. REP. 2543, Conference Report on Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 83rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1954).
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computing the gain or loss from appreciated property exchanged for
a non-commercial annuity. However, the 1954 Code provided no
guidance on how basis should be recovered or how gain or loss
should be reported in transfers of property for annuities. Section
X126 of the ALI Federal Income Tax Statute generally followed the
later scheme adopted in the Internal Revenue Code of allocating each
annuity payment received between return of principal and ordinary
income. 173 In addition, the ALI statute established a general rule of
closed transaction treatment on the exchange of property for annu-
ities. 74 The ALI proposal, however, permitted annuitants to elect to
recognize the gain and recover the basis in the property ratably over
the payments to be received.
75
In its version of the 1954 Code, the House of Representatives
proposed a simple, comprehensive, albeit somewhat drastic, solution
to the "conflicting court decisions" regarding the private annuity
problem. 176 Instead of allowing annuitants to spread the gain in their
transferred property over their life expectancies, the proposed section
would have required annuitants to treat the actuarial determined
value of the annuity received as a part of the amount realized for
their property upon transfer in exchange for the annuity. 177 In a
transfer of property solely for a private annuity not involving a gift,
the entire amount of gain inherent in the property would have been
recognized upon the transfer. The value of the annuity would then
have been the annuitant's investment in the contract for purposes of
section 72. 17 The proposed provision also allowed annuity writers a
deduction for the ordinary income portion of amounts paid to
annuitants. 79 Finally, the House's bill provided that the value of the
annuity would be used to compute the basis of the property trans-
ferred to the annuity writer, subject to recomputation for mortality
gains or losses.' 80 The provision did not appear in the Senate version,
and, in conference the House receded "to provide an opportunity
for further study."''
173. FEDERAL INComE TAx STATuTE § X126(a)-(c) (February, 1954, Draft).
174. Id. at § X126(f)(1)(A).
175. Id. at § X126(f)(1)(B).
176. H.R. CoNF. REP. 2543, Conference Report on Internal Revenue Code of 1954, 83d
Cong., 2d Sess. 71 (1954).
177. Id.
178. Id. at A286-87.
179. Id. at A287.
180. Id. at A287-88.
181. H.R. CoNF. R P. No. 2543, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., 71,
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The 1954 Code as finally enacted resolved the problem of allocating
annuity payments between investment return and return of principal
but left to the courts and the Internal Revenue Service the task of
allocating the principal portion of each payment between return of
basis and gain in annuities received in exchange for appreciated
property. While there were no cases after enactment of the 1954
Code directly on point, apparently, at least in the Tax Court, the
seller's gain in appreciated property exchanged for an unsecured
private annuity would be recognized only after the adjusted basis in
the property had been exhausted. 18 2
C. Ratable Reporting of Gain and Rev. Rul. 69-74
The open transaction treatment for private annuities is very ben-
eficial for annuitants. After 1954, both the government and the
courts made decisions that had the effect of reducing the availability
of open transaction treatment for private annuitants. Beginning in
1969, the Internal Revenue Service issued Revenue Ruling 69-74,183
and the Treasury Department issued a Regulation' 8 that, while resting
on inconsistent theories, both required taxpayers to treat the excluded,
or principal, portion of a private annuity as partially a return of
basis and partially as gain. The Claims Court has followed the
government's "ratable recovery of gain" approach.' 85 By contrast,
the open transaction approach used in the Lloyd case 186 allowed the
taxpayer to treat the entire excluded portion of an annuity payment
as tax-free return of basis until the basis in the exchanged property
was exhausted. 87 The Tax Court, while not adopting a ratable
recovery of gain approach, narrowed the availability of open trans-
action treatment by deciding that secured private annuities should be
treated as closed, rather than open, transactions.' 88
The Internal Revenue Service in Revenue Ruling 69-7481 attempted
to abolish open transaction treatment of private annuities in favor
182. Edgar v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 717, 742 n.15 (1971).
183. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
184. Treas. Reg. 1.1011-2, example (8), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106.
185. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, I CI. Ct. 108 (1983), aff'd 726 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
186. Lloyd v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936), nonacq. XV-2 C.B. 39 (1936), nonacq.
withdrawn and acq. 1950-2 C.B. 3. See supra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 113-114 and accompanying text (discussing Revenue Ruling 239).
188. Bell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 469 (1973).
189. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43. Revenue Ruling 69-74 has been strongly criticized.
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of a ratable recovery of both basis and gain in the principal portion
of each annuity payment. The Service ignored the Lloyd case com-
pletely and attempted to resolve all of the issues of the annuitant
under the concepts of section 72. The Ruling first established the
value of the private annuity by computing its value under the actuarial
tables of the valuation sections of the estate tax regulations. 9 The
ruling used this value, reduced by the adjusted basis of the property
exchanged for the annuity, to compute the gain inherent in the
property at the time of the exchange. 91 The Service then defined the
taxpayer's investment in the annuity contract, the numerator of the
exclusion ratio described by section 72, as the adjusted basis of the
property the taxpayer had transferred in exchange for the annuity. 92
The Service's previous ruling, Rev. Rul. 239, had treated the fair
market value of the property exchanged for the annuity as the
investment in the contract, thus leaving the treatment of gain rec-
ognition in appreciated property outside the annuity rules. 93 By
reversing its former position on the investment in the contract, the
Service could then apply the rules of section 72 to the timing of gain
recognition in private annuity transactions. The Service ruled that
the capital gain income be ratably recovered over the life expectancy
of the annuitant. After the entire capital gain had been reported, the
entire annuity payment in excess of the exclusion would be ordinary
income. 194
The Treasury Department established yet another scheme for com-
puting gain recognition in private annuities in Regulation 1.1011-2195
in 1972. The Regulation was inconsistent in concept with both Rev.
Rul. 69-74 and the Lloyd case. 196 The new Regulation applied to
See Stewart, Private Annuities-Revenue Ruling 69-74 Partially Repudiated, Sub Silentio, By
Treasury Regulation Section 1.1011-2(c), Example (8), 24 MERCER L. REv. 585 (1973); Raiborn
& Watkins, Critical Analysis of Private Annuity Taxation, 50 TAXES 11 (1972); Note, Private
Annuities: Revenue Ruling 69-74-Its Significance, Effect, and Validity, 23 VA'D. L. REv.
675 (1970); Comment, Tax: Income Tax Consequences of the Private Annuity, 41 Miss. L.J.
457 (1970).
190. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
191. Id. at 44.
192. Id.
193. Rev. Rul. 53-239, 1953-2 C.B. 53.
194. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 44. 1969-1 C.B. 44.
195. Treas. Reg. 1.1011-2(c) example 8, T.D. 7072, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 163. The amendment
was a part of an extensive revision of the Regulations applicable to charitable contributions.
Congressional amendments to the charitable contribution rules in the 1969 Tax Reform Act
made the Reg. amendments necessary. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 170,
83 Stat. 487 (1969).
196. See Stewart, supra note 189, at 590, 617; Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 44, Lloyd v.
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bargain sales to a charity, that is, transactions in which an individual
transferred appreciated property to a charity in exchange for an
annuity and in which the value of the property transferred was
greater than that of the annuity. 197 The example involved a transfer
of property worth $100,000 with a $20,000 adjusted basis by a sixty-
five year-old man to a charity in exchange for an annuity of $5,000
per year. Using the estate tax valuation tables, the regulation valued
the annuity at $59,755. Using the actuarial value of the annuity, the
example allocated $11,951 of the basis in the property to the ex-
change, and computed a gain of $47,804 on the exchange. 98 Contrary
to Rev. Rul. 69-74, the example treated the value of the annuity,
not the basis of the property exchanged for the annuity, as the
investment in the contract for annuity purposes. 99 Contrary to the
Lloyd case and consistent with Rev. Rul. 69-74, the example required
the annuitant to prorate his capital gain over his life expectancy.
Thus, the government consistently ruled that the gain in exchanges
of appreciated property for annuities should be recovered ratably
over the life expectancy of the annuitant but reached that result
under inconsistent theories.
Neither Regulations nor Revenue Rulings are written in such a way
as to disclose the reasoning behind their decisions.210 The Claims
Court opinion in Garvey, Inc. v. United States,20 however, provides
a rationale for the government's ratable recovery approach. The
Garvey case involved the transfer of appreciated property by several
individuals to corporations in exchange for unsecured annuities. 202
The Court of Appeals opinion holds that the annuitants should pro
rate their bases over their life expectancies, consistent with both Rev.
Rul. 69-74 and Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2(c) example 8, without deciding
whether basis or fair market value determined the investment in the
contract.0 3 The trial court opinion in Garvey, however, seems clearly
Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936), nonacq. XV-2 C.B. 39 (1936), nonacq. withdrawn and
acq. 1950-2 C.B. 3.
197. Treas. Reg. 1.1011-2(a), T.D. 7207, 1972-2 C.B. 106, 162.
198. Id. at 165.
199. Id. at 165. The Treasury changed its approach to the definition of "investment in the
contract" to conform to the criticism of the Rev. Rul. 69-74 in the Bell case, infra note 211.
O.M. 17802, discussed in Gen. Couns. Mem. 35552 (Nov. 6, 1973).
200. Some of the government's reasoning can be gleaned from Gen. Couns. Mem. 37371
(Dec. 22, 1977); Gen. Couns. Mem. 35552 (Nov. 6, 1973); O.M. 17802 (1972); and Gen.
Couns. Mem. 33656 (Oct. 17, 1967).
201. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, I CI.Ct. 108 (1983), aff'd 726 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir.
1984).
202. Garvey, Inc., 1 Cl. Ct. 108, 120.
203. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 726 F.2d 1569, 1573 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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to rely on using the annuitant's basis as the investment in the
contract." Arguing that Congress only intended the annuitant to be
able to recover his or her investment tax-free, the court concludes
that the return of capital "is necessarily limited to a return of the
annuitant's basis for the property exchanged. ' 205 In holding that
open transaction treatment should not be applied to private annuities,
the court notes that the scope of open transaction treatment had
narrowed since the decision of the original open transaction case,
Burnet v. Logan. The court's research revealed that recent cases had
required courts to find a value for contract rights "except in rare
and extraordinary cases.''206 Relying on United States v. Davis,2 7 the
court also argued that, even if the annuity contract received by the
sellers could not be valued, the contract could be valued because the
consideration exchanged for the annuity in an arm's length transac-
tion could be presumed to be equal in value to the annuity. 203 Finally,
the court relied on the legislative history of the annuity provisions
to argue that ratable recovery of gain was the only method consistent
with ratable recovery of capital. 20 9 While Lloyd and its progeny are
not mentioned in Garvey, the court was clearly aware that it was
departing from applicable precedent. 210
Unlike the Claims Court and the Court of Appeals for the Federal
Circuit, the Tax Court rejected the ratable recovery approach to
204. Garvey, Inc., I Cl. Ct. 108, 124-25.
205. Id. at 125.
206. Id. at 123, quoting McCormac v. United States, 424 F.2d 607, 619 (Cl. Ct. 1970)
(emphasis in both McCormac and Garvey).
207. 370 U.S. 65 (1962), cited by Garvey, Inc., I CI. Ct. 108, 123.
20S. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 CI. Ct. 108, 123-24.
209. Id. at 124-25.
210. Id. at 125 n.20 (1983). In support of their adoption of a ratable gain approach, rather
than the historically accepted open or closed transactions, the court added the following
footnote: See Learned Hand, "How Far is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?" (Radio
Broadcast, May 4 [sic], 1933) reprinted in The Spirit of Liberty-Papers and Addresses of
Learned Hand (I Dillard ed. 1960), at 106:
"How does [the judge] in fact proceed? Although at times he says and believes
that he is not doing so, what he really does is to take the language before him,
whether it be from a statute or from the decision of a former judge, and try to
find out what the government, or his predecessor, would have done, if the case
before had been before them. He calls this finding the intent of the statute or of
the doctrine. This is often not really true. The men who used the language did not
have any intent at all about the case that has come up; it had not occurred to their
minds. Strictly speaking, it is impossible to know what they would have said about
it, if it had. All they have done is to write down certain words which they mean to
apply generally to situations of that kind."
Id.
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
private annuities. Instead, in Estate of Bell v. Comm'r., the Tax
Court limited the sweep of the J. Darsie Lloyd case by distinguishing
it. Lloyd and Grace Bell had transferred stocks to their son and
daughter and their spouses in exchange for a secured, rather than an
unsecured, joint and survivor annuity. To secure the performance of
the annuity writers, the annuity agreement required that the stocks
be escrowed and also provided for "a cognovit judgment against the
transferees in the event of a default. ' 21 2 The court recognized that
the Lloyd decision rested not upon a determination that the private
annuity written by J. Darsie Lloyd was subject not only to the
uncertainty that Harold Lloyd might die, but upon a determination
that J. Darsie Lloyd might be unable to make the payments under
the annuity.2 3 The escrow and the cognovit provision substantially
reduced the risk of the annuitants under the annuity. This reduced
risk allowed the court to use actuarial tables to find a fair market
value for the annuity. Because the court found that the annuity had
a fair market value, the transaction had to be closed for tax purposes,
and all of the gain in the transaction had to be recognized at the
date of the transfer.214 The dissent would have adopted a ratable
recognition rule similar to that prescribed by Rev. Rul. 69-74.2
1s
According to Judge Simpson's dissent, the annuitant's gain should
have been prorated over the annuitant's life expectancy, analogizing
the gain proration to the ratable recognition of ordinary income
under section 72.216 The dissenters, however, rejected the concept
underlying the Revenue Ruling, that the annuitant's adjusted basis
in his property was his investment in the contract, as being inconsis-
tent with the previous decisions of the Tax Court.
217
In summary, during the 1960's and 1970's, the courts and the
government narrowed the scope of the favorable, "open transaction"
treatment traditionaly available to private annuitants. The govern-
211. 60 T.C. 469 (1973). See also Note, Private Annuities: Closed Transactions? Estate of
Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973), 28 Mtaim L. Rev. 445 (1974); Note, Income Tax-Section
72-Definition of Exclusion Ratio and Treatment of Capital Gain Element in a Private
Annuity. Estate of Lloyd G. Bell, 60 T.C. 469 (1973), 52 TEx. L. REv. 149 (1973). On this
point, Bell was followed by 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978). See also Note,
Private Annuities-Capital Gain Treatment for Private Annuities-212 Corporation v. Com-
missioner, 15 WAKE FoIsT L. REv. 724 (1979).
212. Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. at 471.
213. Id. at 475.
214. Id. at 475-76.
215. Id. at 476, 479 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 477 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 476 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
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ment and the Claims Court adopted a ratable recognition scheme,
requiring annuitants to report a portion of each payment as gain,
and the Tax Court required annuitants receiving secured private
annuities to recognize all their gain immediately.
D. Validity of Revenue Rule 69-74
In an exchange of property for an unsecured private annuity, two
different sets of rules potentially apply to recognition of the annui-
tant's gain in the property transferred for the annuity, the annuity
rules or the rules governing sales of property. 218 The transaction may
either be treated as a sale of property followed by the acquisition of
an annuity, or as a unified transaction. 219 The first approach is in
line with the case law before Revenue Rule 69-74 and with the case
of Burnet v. Logan. The second is the approach used in Revenue
Rule 69-74.220 Although the ratable recognition method departs from
the traditional approach to taxing the gain of private annuitants, the
use of a ratable recovery method founded upon the annuity rules is
a valid construction of section 72.
Commentators arguing that Rev. Rul. 69-74 is invalid usually
contend that nothing in the legislative history justifies a change in
the treatment of private annuities. 2 1 This argument normally relies
on the fact that Congress had the opportunity to change the treatment
of gain in private annuities in 19542n and in 1963M but failed to
make any change. The refusal by Congress to make a change,
however, cannot necessarily be considered an approval of the rules
in effect at that time. The Senate's concern in 1954 that the problem
needed more study before changing the law is hardly a ringing
endorsement of the rules in effect in 1954.22 A similar argument can
be made to support Revenue Ruling 69-74. Congress had the oppor-
218. Croft & Hipple, Planning Lifetime Property Transfers: Private Annuities, Installment
Sales and Gift-Leasebacks, 11 REAL PROP., PROBATE, AND TR. J. 253, 263-4 (1976).
219. Note, Private Annuities: Revenue Ruling 69-74-Its Significance, Effect, and Validity,
23 VANr. L. REv. 675, 683-84 (1970).
220. Id.
221. Stewart, supra note 189, at 585.
222. See supra notes 171-182 and accompanying text.
223. The Treasury Department submitted a Technical Memorandum proposing a change
to the private annuity rules to the House Ways and Means Committee, on February 6, 1963,
but nothing came of it. See Midgley, supra note 10, at 693 n.66.
224. See supra note 181 and accompanying text.
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tunity to reverse the government's ratable gain position in 1980 in
the Installment Sales Revision Act and refused to do so.225
The Tax Court has also contended that the definition of "invest-
ment in the contract"226 used in Rev. Rul. 69-74 is inconsistent with
previously established caselaw on the issue.2 7 Under the 1939 Code,
the Tax Court 2 8 and the Service29 had defined "investment in the
contract" as equal to the fair market value of the consideration paid
for the annuity. When one considers the fundamentally different
statutory schemes used under the 1939 and 1954 Codes, however,
the difference in interpretation becomes understandable. Both tile
1954 and 1939 Codes were intended to allow annuitants to recover
the investment in the contract tax-free. The annuity rules under the
1939 Code used an "add-on interest" approach, and under such a
scheme, only by using the fair market value of the annuitant's
consideration would the amount of "interest" income approximate
the taxpayer's return on investment. The 1954 Code, on the other
hand, attempts to give an exact return of the taxpayer's investment
through the exclusion ratio, and then taxes the remainder of each
payment. This scheme, which allows the flexibility to recognize the
taxpayer's negotiated transaction, permits the flexibility to return
tax-free to the taxpayer only the taxpayer's actual investment in an
annuity. In the case of a private annuity received in exchange for
property, the annuitant's actual investment is the basis of the property
exchanged for it.o Thus, the private annuitant's investment in the
contract should be defined as the basis of the property exchanged
225. See infra notes 255-263 and accompanying text.
226. "Investment in the contract" is used in the current (1954 to present) version of the
annuity rules to allow the annuitant to recover the amounts that she had paid for the annuity
tax-free. I.R.C. § 72(b)(1) (1954). "Investment in the contract" is defined, in part, as "the
aggregate amount of premiums or other consideration paid for the contract." I.R.C. § 72(c)(1)
(1954). The phrase, "aggregate premiums or other consideration paid" was adopted in the
1934 revision of the annuity rules for a similar purpose. Rev. Act of 1934 § 22(b)(2). See
supra notes 93-103 and accompanying text. See also Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 60 T.C.
469, 472 (1973). Under the rules in effect from 1934-1954, the annuitant had to report "3
percentum of the aggregate premiums or consideration paid for such annuity" as ordinary
income. Rev. Act of 1934 § 22(b)(2). Under the 1954 rules, the taxpayer computes an exclusion
from gross income by multiplying "investment in the contract" by the amount received under
the annuity/expected return from the annuity. Treas. Reg. 1.72-4(a)(4), T.D. 6211, 1956-2
C.B. 29. See supra notes 162-170 and accompanying text.
227. Estate of Bell v. Commmissioner, 60 T.C. 469; 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.
788.
228. de Canizares v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 345 (1959).
229. Rev. Rul. 53-239, 1953-2 C.B. 53. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
230. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108 at 109.
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for the annuity rather than the fair market value of the property. 23'
Therefore, Revenue Ruling 69-74 is a valid interpretation of section
72.
Some authorities would uphold the validity of a ratable recovery
of basis approach even if "investment in the contract" is defined as
the fair market value of the property exchanged for the annuity.232
While defining the term "investment in the contract" in private
annuities as the basis of the property the annuitant exchanged for
the annuity is the preferable interpretation of the term, some au-
thorities would apply a ratable recovery of basis approach even if
the "investment in the contract" were defined differently. 233
V. TiE INSTALLMENT SALES REVISION ACT AND PRIVATE ANNUITIES
In the mid-1970's, after the decision in the Bell case, there were
three recognized approaches for recognizing the gain element in
private annuities. For unsecured annuities, the government's ratable
recognition under section 72, and the open transaction treatment
under the Lloyd case, had received official blessing. If the annuity
was secured, the Bell decision required closed transaction treatment.2 34
The Installment Sales Revision Act of 19802 5 added a fourth possible
gain recognition scheme, installment reporting, to the already complex
law of private annuities.
A. History of Installment Reporting
Before the Installment Sales Revision Act, the installment sales
provisions of the Code did not apply directly to private annuities.
The concepts of installment sale reporting grew up as an administra-
tive practice before being codified in 1926. Reporting the income
from installment sales as a portion of each payment received was
accepted at least for some sales of real estate and for dealers in
231. Id.
232. Gen. Couns. Mem. 35,552 (Nov. 6, 1973); Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 726 F.2d
1569, 1574; Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 60 TC. 469, 479 (Simpson, J., dissenting).
233. Id.
234. See generally Midgley, Federal Income Taxation of Private Annuitants, 40 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 679 (1972).
235. Pub. L. No. 96-471, 94 Stat. 2247 (1980).
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personal property early in the history of the income tax.236 After the
Board of Tax Appeals invalidated use of the installment method for
sellers of real estate and dealers in personal property in 1925,237
Congress added section 212(d) to the Revenue Act of 1926, specifi-
cally permitting dealers and casual sellers of both real and personal
property to elect the installment method.2 8 The installment reporting
rules, however, required that the contract or plan have a stated
contract price, something that annuities measured by the life of an
individual usually lack. 239 Further, the legislative history of the in-
stallment sale provisions made it quite clear that the installment
method would only apply to sales on a conventional installment plan,
not to other sales with deferred payments.
Installment sales treatment allows a taxpayer to report the gain
from a sale with deferred payments as the payments are received.
Generally, the installment seller multiplies the amount of each prin-
cipal payment received by the "gross profit percentage" for the sale
and reports the resulting product as gain. 24" The seller determines the
gross profit percentage for the transaction by dividing the gross profit
by the contract price in the transaction. 242 The gross profit from a
sale is determined by subtracting the taxpayer's adjusted basis243 in
the property sold from the selling price. 244 The seller computes the
contract price of the transaction by subtracting the indebtedness
236. O.D. 181, 1 C.B. 76 (1919) permitted installment treatment in a sale of land where
the seller could not discount or sell the promissory notes received "on account of the lack of
credit of the buyers." The ruling required the taxpayer to allocate each payment between
return of basis and gain. The ruling indicated that the seller would have had to report all of
his gain in the year of the sale if the notes had been "the equivalent of cash." See also I.T.
1192, I-I C.B. 78 (1922); Article 45, Regulations 45 (1920 ed.). I.T. 1227, I-1 C.B. 77 (1922)
(construing the 1918 Revneue Act and explaining how dealers in personal property might apply
the installment method).
237. Appeal of Six Hundred and Fifty West End Ave. Co., 2 B.T.A. 958 (1925); Appeal
of Manomet Cranberry Co., 1 B.T.A. 706 (1925); Appeal of B.B. Todd, Inc., 1 B.T.A. 762
(1925).
238. Revenue Act of 1926, ch. 27 § 212(d), 44 Stat. 9 (1926).
239. Section 212(d) described the amount of income that the taxpayer should report as
"that proportion of the installment payments actually received in that year which the total
profit realized or to be realized when the payment is completed bears to the total contract
price." Revenue Act of 1926, § 212(d), ch. 27, 44 Stat. 9 (1926).
240. "Deferred-payment contracts other than installment contracts are not affected by the
committee amendment." S. REP. No. 52, 69th Cong., Ist Sess. 19 (1926).
241. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(i), T.D. 7768, 1981-1 C.B. 296.
242. Id.
243. Selling expenses and commissions are added to adjusted basis for the purpose of
computing gross profit. Id. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(v).
244. Selling price includes all consideration paid for the property, including encumbrances
assumed by the buyer or to which the buyer took the property. Id. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(ii).
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assumed by the buyer or indebtedness to which the property was
subject 24 from the selling price of the property.
24 6
Transactions which did not qualify for installment treatment, and
those in which the taxpayer did not choose to use the installment
method, could be classified either as closed or open transactions. If
the taxpayer received an obligation that was the equivalent of cash
24 7
or had a fair market value,2 8 the taxpayer received closed transaction
treatment. For the cash method taxpayer, closed transaction treatment
meant using the sum of the cash received plus the fair market value
of any obligations or other property received as the amount realized
in the transaction.24 9 The amount realized less the basis was the gain
that the taxpayer reported as income in the year the property was
sold.20
If the obligation received by the taxpayer did not have a fair
market value, the taxpayer received open transaction treatment.
2 51
Open transaction treatment allowed taxpayers to recover their entire
basis in the transferred property before reporting any gain.2 12 Open
transaction treatment gave the taxpayer the greatest possible tax
deferral, and, of course, was much sought after. 2 3 The incentives
for attempting to qualify any sale with any sort of contingent payment
as an open transaction became even more compelling when one
245. The precise term under the current regulations for the indebtedness subtracted from
selling price to compute contract price is "qualifying indebtedness." Qualifying indebtedness
does not include "obligation[s] of the taxpayer incurred incident to the disposition of the
property" or "obligation[s] functionally unrelated to the acquisition, holding, or operating of
the property." Id. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(iv).
246. Id. § 15A.453-1(b)(2)(iii).
247. Cowden v. Commissioner, 289 F.2d 20 (5th Cir. 1961).
248. Warren Jones Co. v. Commissioner, 524 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1975).
249. Accrual method taxpayers report the amount of cash, plus the face value of obligations
and the fair market value of other property received as the amount realized.
250. I.R.C. § 1001(a).
251. Burnet v. Logan, 283 U.S. 404 (1930).
252. Id.
253. Ginsburg, Taxing the Sale for Future Payment, 30 TAx L. REv. 471, 476 (1975).
Attempting to qualify for open transaction treatment could have severe risk. As Professor
Ginsburg states:
Rules of sportive justice are engraved in the tax law, and special reward may be
balanced by special risk. The Commissioner is committed to asserting that contingent
obligations have currently ascertainable value, open transactions are closed and
nonnegotiable notes and mere contractual obligations are the equivalent of cash....
When he prevails, the advantage to the revenue may extend far beyond accelerated
recognition of part of the seller's total gain. Sportive justice here prevails when the
property sold was a capital asset.... [I]f the buyer was an individual or an evidence
of indebtedness is lacking, the seller's profit on future collection will be converted
to ordinary income.
Id. at 477.
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considers the alternatives. Since installment sales treatment, allowing
taxpayers to spread their income over the length of the installment
payments and also allowing them to recover a portion of their basis
tax-free each year, was not available for any installment sale subject
to contingencies, 2 4 the taxpayer's only alternative to open transaction
treatment was being taxed on all of his gain in the year of the sale.
B. The Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980
One of the objectives of the Installment Sales Revision Act of
1980 was to extend installment sale treatment and ratable recovery
of gain to deferred payment sales that lacked a stated selling price
or that were subject to contingencies. 5 The legislation reflects this
intent by including in the definition of installment sale any "dispo-
sition of property where at least one payment is to be received after
the close" of the year of disposition. 216 By making installment re-
porting available to sellers who legitimately used contingent prices or
time periods on their sales contracts, Congress intended to ameliorate
the Draconian treatment of closed transaction treatment for the
deferred payment seller and induce sellers not to write "convoluted"
sales agreements just to qualify for open transaction treatment. 257 In
addition, the legislative history seems to indicate that Congress in-
tended to make the open transaction unavailable in some transactions
in which it had traditionally been available. 258
The application of the installment sales rules to private annuities
is somewhat problematical. Under the revised installment sales rules,
an installment sale is defined as "a disposition of property where at
least one payment is to be received after the close of the taxable
year in which the disposition occurs.' '259 A private annuity received
in exchange for appreciated property seems to fit within the defini-
tion, particularly in view of apparent congressional intent to expand
254. In re Steen, 509 F.2d 1398 (9th Cir. 1975); Gralapp v. United States, 458 F.2d 1158
(10th Cir. 1972).
255. H.R. RP. No. 96-1042, Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess.,
20-21 (1980).
256. I.R.C. § 453(b)(1). The Revision Act also required the Treasury Department to draft
regulations providing for "ratable basis recovery in transactions where the gross profit or the
total contract price (or both) cannot be readily ascertained." I.R.C. § 453(j)(2).
257. H.R. REP. No. 1042, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1980).
258. Id. at 21. Goldberg, Open Transaction Treatment for Deferred Payment Sales After
the Installment Sales Act of 1980, 34 TAx LAW. 605, 614-616 (1981).
259. I.R.C. § 453(b)(1).
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the reach of the installment sales rules. Both the Senate and House
Reports on the Installment Sales Revision Act, however, contain
footnotes stating that "the bill does not deal directly with" private
annuity transactions. 260 The commentators have differed on whether
the installment sales rules should apply to private annuities. 261 The
Internal Revenue Service, however, reads section 453 and its legis-
lative history as giving the government the right to establish guidelines
on the dividing line between installment sales and annuities.262 The
Service has read the legislative history as follows:
[W]e believe the statement in the committee reports referring spe-
cifically to private annuities confirms our belief that the legislation
was not intended to subject private annuity transactions to the
installment reporting rules.
26 13
Therefore, the government seems to be unlikely to apply the install-
ment sales rules to private annuities.
V. THE IMPACT OF SELF-CANCELLING INSTALLMENT NOTES
At the same time that revision of the installment sales rules made
installment sales more attractive, a Tax Court decision made available
an economically attractive alternative to the private annuity, the self-
cancelling installment note or SCIN.26 In Estate of Moss, Moss had
sold stock and real estate to the corporation that he had controlled
in exchange for an installment promissory note that contained a
provision that required that the note would be cancelled if the seller
died before the end of the term of the note. The Internal Revenue
260. H.R. REP. No. 1042, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 10, n.12 (1980); S. REP. No. 1000, 96th
Cong., 2d Sess. 12, n.12 (1980).
261. Professor Ginsburg has argued that the installment sales rules should not be applied
to private annuities. Ginsburg, Future Payment Sales After the 1980 Revision Act, 39 INST.
ON FED. TAX'N § 43.09[4] (1981). Professors Manning and Hesch, on the other hand, have
argued that installment sales regulations should be applied to private annuities, at least as an
elected alternative to the statutory scheme under I.R.C. § 72. Manning and Hesch, Private
Annuities After the Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, 6 REv. OF TAX'N OF INDIVs. 20,
21 (1982).
262. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39053 (Nov. 7, 1983).
263. Id.
264. Estate of Moss, 74 T.C. 1239 (1980). The SCIN is sometimes also called the Death
Terminating Installment Sale. See Roszak, Installment Sales Terminating at Death Versus
Private Annuities as Estate Planning Devices, 59 J. TAx'N 20 (1983); Banoff & Hartz, It's No
Sin to SCIN! A Reply to Professor Blum on Self-Cancelling Installment Notes, 60 TAxEs 187
(1982); Blum, Self-Cancelling Installment Notes-the New SCIN Game?, 60 TAXEs 183 (1982);
Banoff & Hartz, Sales of Property: Will Self-Cancelling Installment Notes Make Private
Annuities Obsolete?, 59 TAX=s 499 (1981).
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Service had argued that the cancellation provision made the notes
includable in the gross estate of Moss at his death. The Court,
analogizing the contract to a private annuity, held that the notes
could not be included in the gross estate either under section 2033
or section 2036.265
Obviously, the self-cancelling installment note is economically very
similar to a private annuity. In both cases, the seller is transferring
property for a stream of payments. In both cases, the stream of
payments ends upon the death of the seller. The major difference
between the two types of transactions is that the liability of the buyer
in the self-cancelling installment note is limited by a final date, while
the annuity writer must continue to pay until the annuitant dies. To
prevent abuse and to provide for a clear division, the Internal
Revenue Service has limited the permissible time period for install-
ment sales to the life expectancy of the seller. If the term of the
note equals or exceeds the life expectancy of the seller, it will be
classified as an annuity. 266
The income tax consequences of self-cancelling installment notes are
governed by the rules applicable to installment sales generally. 267 There-
fore, each payment received by the seller is allocated between tax-free
return of basis, gain from the sale, and interest.6 Recapture income,
however, will be recognized in the year of the disposition. 6 9 If the
installment note does not provide for sufficient interest, a portion of
each principal payment will be treated as interest under the imputed
interest rules in the Code,270 In addition, the installment sales rules
provide that forgiven payments will be treated as though the seller had
received the payments. 271 Also, under certain circumstances, the install-
ment sales provisions restrict transactions involving related parties2 72
and restrict the seller's ability to borrow against installment obliga-
tions. 273
265. Estate of Moss, 74 T.C. 1239, 1244-1249.
266. Rev. Rul. 86-72, explained in Gen. Couns. Mem. 39503 (May 7, 1986).
267. Roszak, supra note 264, at 23. This position seems to be implicit in the discussion of
SCIN's in Gen. Couns. Mem. 39503 (May 7, 1986).
268. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39503 (May 7, 1986).
269. I.R.C. § 453(i).
270. I.R.C. §§ 483, 1271-1274. These rules generally apply to any disposition of property
where the value of the property exceeds $10,000.
271. I.R.C. § 453B(f).
272. If the seller sells property to a related party, and if the related party resells the
property within two years from the date of the original installment sale, the proceeds received
by the related party on the second sale will be treated as received by the installment seller.
I.R.C. § 453(e)(1). If the property, sold by the installment seller consists of marketable securities,
any resale by the related party will be attributed to the installment seller. I.R.C. § 453(e)(2).
273. See I.R.C. § 453C.
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The use of death terminating installment sales should reinforce the
trend toward using a ratable recovery approach in taxing the gain in
private annuity transactions. The private annuity is economically very
similar to the death terminating installment sale. The installment sale
rules applicable to the death terminating installment sale produces a
ratable recovery of gain. It is an axiom of tax policy to try to tax
similar transactions in a similar way. Thus, the private annuity should
be taxed under a ratable recovery approach as well.
VI. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW OF PRiVATE ANNUITIES
The income tax consequences of private annuities entered into
today are unsettled, particularly for annuitants. If the parties enter
into an unsecured annuity, the safest approach for reporting the
annuitant's gain is to prorate the gain over the life expectancy of
the annuitant under section 72.274 Because the ratable recovery ap-
proach has been adopted in recent government rulings 27 5 it is more
likely than the open transaction approach to receive a favorable audit
report. Even under this approach, however, it is unclear whether the
basis of the property transferred in exchange for the annuity is the
annuitant's investment in the contract, 276 or whether the fair market
value of the annuity is the investment in the contract. 277 If the matter
of the gain recognition were litigated in the Tax Court, it is unclear
what the court might decide. The court might apply the open trans-
action principles of the Lloyd decision278 which has never been
overruled. While the Tax Court narrowly refused to adopt a ratable
recovery approach in the Bell case, a majority of the current court
might adopt a ratable gain recognition approach.2 79 It is even con-
ceivable that a court, finding that the terms of a private annuity fit
the definition of an installment sale, would try to apply installment
sales principles to the transaction.2 0
It seems well established that annuity writers do not receive an
interest deduction,2s1 and that an annuity writer's basis will generally
274. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108 (1983);
Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2, example (8) (1972). See supra notes 183 & 195 and accompanying text.
275. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2(c), example (8) (1972). See
supra notes 183 & 195 and accompanying text.
276. Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43; Garvey, Inc. v. United States, Cl. Ct. 108 (1983).
277. Treas. Reg. § 1.1011-2(c), example 8 (1972).
278. Lloyd v. Commissioner, 33 B.T.A. 903 (1936), nonacq. XV-2 C.B. 39 (1936), nonacq.
withdrawn and acq. 1950-2 C.B. 3.
279. Estate of Bell, 60 T.C. 469, 479 (Simpson, J., dissenting.)
280. Manning and Hesch, supra note 10.
281. See supra notes 150-160 and accompanying text.
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be treated as the sum of the payments made to the annuitant, 2 2 but
there is authority to the contrary. 3 It is also clear that some of the
differences in tax treatment between the death terminating installment
sales and private annuities, particularly the denial of interest deduc-
tions for writers of private annuities, create differential tax treatment
for economically very similar transactions. 23 A careful reconsidera-
tion of the rules governing private annuities is clearly in order.
VI. PRolS FOR TAXATION OF PRrvATE ANNUiTiEs
Revising the tax treatment of private annuities will probably not
be the subject of Congressional action in the near future.25  The
private annuity is economically very similar to several other trans-
actions, from the split purchase of life interests and remainders to
the death terminating installment sale.286 To rationalize the tax treat-
ment of all of these economically similar instruments and reduce or
eliminate the differences in tax treatment among them, however,
would require a number of amendments to the Code.287 Making
significant changes to the Code for the sake of reform seems unlikely
in the present legislative climate. Politically, the support for tax
reform, even reforms intended to benefit large numbers of taxpayers,
is like many of the creeks in the Western Great Plains, completely
dry most of the time, and very shallow and slow moving when the
current is running. The small but organized opposition usually has
a stronger voice and can prevent reform easily.28 Moreover, since
the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and its subsequent technical corrections,
the political force for tax reform is largely spent, and the Congres-
sional focus is on larger concerns and on raising money to reduce
the deficit. 289
282. See Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352. See also supra notes 131-146 and accompanying
text.
283. See, e.g., Commissioner v. John C. Moore Corp., 42 F.2d 186 (2d Cir. 1930).
284. Banoff & Hartz, Self-Cancelling Installment Notes: New I.R.S. Rulings Expand
Opportunities, 65 J. TAx'N 146 (1986).
285. On the hazards of predicting Congressional action, see Verdier, A Framework for
Predicting Congressional Action, 41 TAX NoTES 435 (1988).
286. Lane, Intra-Family Sales: Toward a Uniform Tax Treatment, 41 TAX LAW. 279
(vinter 1988).
287. Id. at 322-323.
288. See generally J. BnutiAUMi & A. MuRRAY, SHOWDOWN AT Gucci GuLcH (1987). Using
James Verdier's Framework, the private annuity problem will generate insufficient excitement
for reform, the solutions have received insufficient attention to drive a reform effort, and the
issue offers little to gain for the politicians involved. Verdier, supra note 285, at 436-441.
Therefore, it seems an unlikely candidate for congressional action in the near future.
289. H.R. CoNy. REP. No. 99-841, Tax Reform Act of 1986-Conference Report to
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Therefore, the income tax rules applicable to private annuities
should be revised through rulings or regulations. While conforming
the income tax treatment of private annuities completely to the
economic and actuarial principles that underlie them is impossible
under the current statute, 290 significant improvements can be made.
The gain in the annuitant's appreciated property exchanged for a
private annuity should be recovered ratably over the annuitant's life
expectancy, with adjustments for mortality gains and losses.291 In
recognition of the notions of the time value of money incorporated
in the Code in the 1980's, the ordinary income portion of private
annuities should be treated as interest paid by annuity writers.2 9 The
basis of annuity writers in property acquired in exchange for private
annuities should recognize the interest element in annuities and should
produce more certain results. 293 These changes in the income tax
treatment of private annuities will also reduce the differences in tax
treatment between private annuities and the instrument most often
compared with private annuities, installment sales terminating at the
death of the seller.2 14 Revised rulings or regulations on the income
tax consequences of private annuities under the current statutory
scheme should incorporate the following principles:
A. Ratable Recognition of Gain
1. The principles of section 72, the annuity rules, rather than the
principles of section 453, the installment sales provisions, should
Accompany H.R. 3838, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 11-838 (1986) reports a Senate sponsored sense
of the Congress resolution that "the provisions of the Internal Revenue Code that are added
or amended in the current legislation should remain unchanged for a period of at least five
years from the date of enactment." While Congress has passed two significant tax bills since
the 1986 Act, DEFRA and TAMRA, these have largely been in the nature of tinkering to
make the provisions of the 1986 reform work better. The tax bills currently under study in
the Congress involve raising revenue to help to control the budget deficit, on attempting to
make the fringe-benefit non-discrimination rules of section 89 workable, and returning preferred
treatment for capital gains to the Code (a provision advocated because it can, allegedly, raise
revenue). Rosenthal, Bentsen to Treasury: Take a (Useful) Stand on Section 89, 43 TAX NoTEs
779 (1989); Jones, JCT, Archer Moving Ahead on Capital Gains Proposal, 43 TAX NoTEs
1303 (1989).
290. See Lane, supra note 286. The current annuity rules in I.R.C. section 72 treat all
payments under an annuity as consisting of the same proportion of principal and interest. In
reality, the amount of interest in the payments decreases over the term of the annuity and the
principal element increases. See supra note 70.
291. See infra notes 295-324 and accompanying text.
292. See infra notes 325-335 and accompanying text.
293. See infra notes 336-351 and accompanying text.
294. See, e.g., Roszak, Installment Sales Terminating at Death Versus Private Annuities
as Estate Planning Devices, 59 J. TAX'N 20 (1983).
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govern the recognition of annuitant's gain in appreciated property
exchanged for a private annuity. 295
Ratable recovery is the soundest approach to recognizing the
annuitant's gain in her appreciated property. Open transaction treat-
ment, as used in the Lloyd case, permits the annuitant unjustified
tax deferral, and, if the annuitant dies prematurely, may permit all,
or a substantial portion of the annuitant's gain to go untaxed. 296 In
contrast, recognizing all of the annuitant's gain upon entering into
the annuity-closed transaction treatment-may leave the annuitant
with a large tax liability and insufficient funds available to pay the
tax. Ratable recovery prevents annuitants from having liquidity prob-
lems because it enables annuitants to match their tax liability with
the receipt of annuity proceeds. 297
Both on the grounds of narrow legislative history and tax policy,
the annuity provisions of section 72, rather than the installment sales
provisions of section 453, should govern the gain recognition con-
sequences of private annuities. Section 72 is designed specifically to
govern transactions in which the amount that the taxpayer will receive
depends on the taxpayer's lifespan. Within the terms of the agreement
negotiated by the parties, specific rules have been developed to govern
return of the annuitant's investment, to tax the interest element
inherent in annuities, and to deal with the mortality gains and losses
inherent in annuities. 298 In addition, supplementary rules are available
to deal with provisions, such as refund features, not usually included
in private annuities.2 99 Developing rules to govern gain recognition
for contingent payment sales, on the other hand, has proven to be
a very difficult problem.3°°
While the broad definition of the installment sale in section 453
arguably includes private annuities, the legislative history seems to
indicate that Congress did not intend that the installment sale rules
be extended to them.3 1 Therefore, any ruling or regulation applying
295. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,503 (May 7, 1986). Ginsburg, Future Payment Sales After the
1980 Revision Act, 39 INST. ON FED. TAX'N § 43.09 (1981). But see Manning and Hesch supra
note 10.
296. Midgley, Federal Income Taxation of Private Annuitants, 40 GEo. WAsH. L. RtV.
679, 705 (1972).
297. H.R. RaP. No. 1042, Installment Sales Revision Act of 1980, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5
(1980).
298. I.R.C. § 72(b).
299. I.R.C. § 72(c)(2).
300. Ginsburg, Taxing Future Payments, supra note 10, at 474-478.
301. See supra notes 256-262 and accompanying text.
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the installment sales rules to private annuities could be easily chal-
lenged as inconsistent with legislative intent.
Applying the annuity provisions rather than the installment sales
provisions of the Code to the timing of gain or loss recognition in
private annuities leaves private annuities as a possible avenue for
escaping some difficult strictures in the installment sales rules. For
example, the installment sales provisions specifically provide that
ordinary income from recaptures will be recognized immediately upon
the disposition. 0 2 The same result should obtain under section 72,
but the result would have to be inferred from the absence of a
special provision requiring ratable recognition in the recapture pro-
visions. 3°0 The absence of specific rules governing the disposition of
private annuity contracts, rules analogous to section 453B,304 may
not be a serious problem because of the difference between an annuity
and an installment sales agreement. It is unlikely that an outsider
would be willing to assume the open-ended obligation imposed upon
the annuity writer.
Applying section 453B to private annuities might even produce
expensive anomalies for annuitants. The death of the annuitant before
the end of her life expectancy and the consequent termination of
payments might be treated as the "disposition" of "an installment
obligation" (the annuity). If so, section 453B would treat the seller
as receiving the remaining payments, including, perhaps, the remain-
ing payments over annuitant's life expectancy, on the date of death.
30
1
If the annuity payments that would have been payable over the
annuitant's remaining life expectancy were considered remaining pay-
ments, the annuitant would have a substantial, unexpected tax lia-
bility.
306
The congressional revision of the installment sales rules in the
1980's has included the enactment of provisions to prevent taxpayers
from taking undue advantage of the installment sales rules. These
anti-abuse provisions include rules to inhibit installment sellers from
borrowing against installment obligations30 7 and to prevent purchasers
302. I.R.C. § 453(i).
303. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 453(a)(1), (b).
304. I.R.C. § 453B provides generally that all unrecognized gain from an installment sale
shall be recognized when the obligee disposes of the installment obligation.
305. See Rev. Rul. 86-72, 1986-1 C.B. 253.
306. Ginsburg, supra note 295 at § 43.09[4][a]; Manning & Hesch, supra note 10 at 35-6.
307. I.R.C. § 453A(a)(1) generally provides that installment sellers pay interest to the
government on the amount of tax liability that the seller has deferred through use of the
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of property from disposing of the property for cash when the
purchaser acquired the property from a related party in an installment
sale.308 The annuity rules do not contain such anti-abuse provisions.
The absence of anti-abuse safeguards in the annuity rules might
provide opportunities for taxpayer abuse. A small amount of taxpayer
abuse, however, may be the inevitable result of excluding private
annuities from the installment sales provisions. In addition, if using
the private annuity rules to avoid restrictions in the installment sales
provisions becomes a problem, the broad regulatory authority given
to the Treasury under the installment sales rules3°9 might be used to
prevent abuse.
Revenue Ruling 69-74,310 the ruling currently governing the tax
consequences to annuitants from private annuities, should be revised
to conform to the current provisions of section 72. The ruling's oft-
criticized requirement that the annuitant's basis in the property
exchanged for an annuity be treated as the annuitant's investment in
the contract must be retained, because the approach adopted in the
Revenue Ruling is completely consistent with the statutory scheme
of section 72.311 Section 72 requires all annuitants to pro-rate their
investment in the contract over their life expectancy.312 Treating the
annuitant's basis as the investment in the contract provides a statutory
foundation for pro-rating the annuitant's gain in the property ex-
changed for the annuity over the annuitant's life expectancy.313 Using
the fair market value of the property as the investment in the
contract, 3 4 on the other hand, does not provide such a solid statutory
foundation because there is no statutory provision requiring gain
installment sales provisions, This rule applies to obligations in which the selling price exceeds
$150,000, and where the total face amount of the seller's outstanding installment obligations
exceeds $5 million. I.R.C. § 453A(b). Section 453A(a)(2) treats the pledging of an installment
obligation as a disposition of the obligation. I.R.C. § 453A(a)(2).
308. I.R.C. § 453(e). This provision applies when the buyer who is related to the seller in
an installment sale disposes of the property that was the subject of the installment sale within
two years of the installment sale. Id. § 453(e)(1), (e)(2). If the buyer then resells the property,
the consideration received by the buyer will be treated as a payment received by the seller. Id.
§ 453(e)(1).
309. I.R.C. §§ 453(j), 453A(e).
310. Rev, Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43.
311. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108, 125-26 (1983).
312. I.R.C. § 72(b)(1).
313. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108, 125-26. For a further discussion of this
point, see supra notes 218-233 and accompanying text.
314. 212 Corp. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 788 (1978); Estate of Bell v. Commissioner, 60
T.C. 469 (1973). For cases decided under provisions of the 1939 code, see Hill's Estate v.
Maloney, 58 F. Supp. 164 (D.N.J. 1944); de Canizares v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 345 (1959).
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within the "investment in the contract" to be recognized. 3 5 Defining
the investment in the contract as the fair market value of the property
arguably permits the gain inherent in the transferred property to
escape taxation completelyY
6
Revenue Ruling 69-74 should also be up-dated to conform to the
new treatment of mortality gains and losses in section 72.317 In 1986,
Congress amended section 72 to provide for individualized treatment
of mortality gains and losses in annuities. Annuitants who die before
reaching their life expectancies receive a deduction for unrecovered
investment to the contract.318 If the annuitant dies before exhausting
her life expectancy, the remaining basis in the transferred property
should be deducted on the annuitant's final income tax return as a
loss. 319 In cases of annuities purchased for cash, the annuitant receives
an ordinary deduction, because the annuitant has reported ordinary
income. 320 In a private annuity, the annuitant reports both ordinary
income and capital gain. The character of the deduction in a private
annuity received for appreciated property should be, in part, ordinary
income, and in part, determined by the character of the property
exchanged for the private annuity.312  If the annuitant exchanged a
capital asset held for more than a year for the annuity, a portion of
the deduction for unrecovered investment in the contract should be
a long term capital loss. 322 If the annuitant outlives her life expec-
tancy, she loses the benefit of the exclusion, and all of the annuity
payments are then ordinary income.
323
315. The dissenters in the Estate of Bell case would have treated the fair market value of
the transferred property as the investment in the contract and would have prorated the gain
over the annuitant's life expectancy under the general principles of section 72. Estate of Bell,
60 T.C. 469, 479 (Simpson, J., dissenting). General principles, however, do not amount to a
solid statutory foundation.
316. Garvey, Inc. v. United States, 1 Cl. Ct. 108, 125 (1983).
317. I.R.C. § 72(b)(2), (b)(3).
318. I.R.C. § 72(b)(3).
319. Id. Again, using the fair market value of the property transferred in exchange for the
annuity as the "investment in the contract" would pose difficult problems for determining the
amount and character of the deduction to be claimed by the annuitant. See supra note 298
and accompanying text.
320. I.R.C. § 72(b)(3).
321. See generally Arrowsmith v. Commissioner, 344 U.S. 6 (1952). The portion of the
deduction attributable to ordinary income could be determined by the following formula: 01*
Unrecovered Investment in the Contract/Payment where 01 is the amount of ordinary income
in each annuity payment, and Payment is the amount of each annuity payment. The character
of the remainder of the deduction would be determined by the character of the gain on the
asset exchanged for the private annuity.
322. Id.
323. I.R.C. § 72(b)(2).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
The distinction in tax treatment between secured and unsecured
annuities should be abolished. The cases requiring all of the gain in
property to be recognized immediately upon an exchange for a
secured private annuity attempted to limit the sweep of the Lloyd
case's open transaction treatment. 24 Open transactions and closed
transactions are conceptually foreign to the application of section 72
to private annuities in Revenue Ruling 69-74. Secured annuities are
subject to the same mortality contingencies that unsecured annuities
are, and both should be treated under section 72 for all purposes.
In addition, treating secured annuities as a closed transaction treats
them as a sale or exchange of property. As a sale or exchange of
property, rather than a private annuity, the secured private annuity
could arguably be treated as an installment sale under section 453,
creating an undesirable confusion in the tax law applicable to private
annuities.
B. Interest Deduction for Annuity Writers
The ordinary income portion of private annuities should be treated
as interest, deductible for the annuity writer under Internal Revenue
Code section 163.
Commentators have long urged the government and the courts to
recognize the interest element in private annuities.32 5 The majority of
cases involving private annuities, however, have consistently rejected
treating the ordinary income portion of private annuities as interest. 26
The usual reason given is that annuities lack a stated principal sum
and that any computation of interest would have to be based upon
"some esoteric concept derived from subtle and theoretic [sic]
analysis ' 327 such as present value analysis.
Economically, however, the ordinary income portion of an annuity
is interest. It is based upon the time value of the money invested to
obtain the annuity.328 The level of economic sophistication evidenced
in the federal tax law is much greater than it was in the 1930's.
Reversing earlier holdings that there was no gift involved in interest-
324. See Note, Private Annuities-Capital Gain Treatment for Private Annuities-212
Corporation v. Commissioner, 15 WAE FOREST L. REv. 724, 733-734 (1979).
325. See, e.g., Galvin, Income Tax Consequences of Agreements Involving Noncommercial
Annuities, 29 TEx. L. REv. 469, 491-497 (1951).
326. See supra notes 149-161 and accompanying text.
327. Old Colony R.R. Co. v. Commissioner, 284 U.S. 552, 561 (1932).
328. Johnson, Special Commentary II, supra note 29, at 238-39 (1987).
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free demand loans, the Supreme Court used time value of money
concepts to find a financial benefit in interest-free loans.329 Concepts
of the time value of money and present value have been incorporated
wholesale in the Internal Revenue Code in the 1980's.330 While
annuities are specifically excluded from the operation of the imputed
interest rules, 331 this does not mean that Congress has not recognized
the "interest" element of annuities. Congress has probably just left
the computation of the ordinary income element of annuities to the
annuity tables. 332 In 1988, Congress enacted a provision requiring the
Treasury Department to publish annuity tables monthly based upon
current interest rates, 333 a clear recognition of the existence of an
interest element in annuities. In view of the pervasive incorporation
of the concepts of the time value of money in the tax law, the writers
of private annuities should be able to treat the ordinary income
element of an annunity as interest, subject to the restrictions imposed
upon the interest deduction under section 163.11
4
Once annuitants have outlived their life expectancies, however, the
entire payment received by annuitants is ordinary income. Treating
the entire payment as deductible interest after annuitants have at-
tained their life expectancies would give the annuity writers an
excessive benefit. Therefore, a suggested method for annuity writers
to use in allocating payments between principal and interest after the
expiration of annuitants, life expectancies is described below in
connection with determining the annuity writer's basis in the acquired
property.
335
C. Basis of Acquired Property
The basis of property acquired in exchange for a private annuity
is the most difficult issue involving private annuities. Because the
number of years that the annuitant will live is uncertain, it is
impossible to establish the amount that the annuity writer has paid
for the property acquired until the annuitant has died.
329. Dickman v. Commissioner, 465 U.S. 330, 336 (1984).
330. See I.R.C. §§ 483, 1271-1288, 7872.
331. I.R.C. §§ 1275(a)(1)(B); id. § 483(c)(3).
332. Manning & Hesch, supra note 10 at 38.
333. I.R.C, § 7520 (1989).
334. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 163(d).
335. See infra notes 340-351 and accompanying text.
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Revenue Ruling 55-119, the source of the current rules for basis
of property acquired in exchange for a private annuity, assumes that
all payments made by the annuity writer under the annuity contract
are capital expenditures .336 It recognizes no deductible interest element
in annuity payments. Revenue Ruling 55-119 should be replaced as
a part of the comprehensive revision of the private annuity rules
advocated by this article. The replacement ruling for Revenue Ruling
55-119 would have to treat only the nondeductible, principal, portion
of the annuity writer's payment as includible in the basis of the
property. The fundamental approach taken by Revenue Ruling 55-
119, however, that the basis of property acquired in exchange for an
annuity should be based, whenever possible, on the amount of
nondeductible payments made by the annuity writer, is fundamentally
sound and should be retained. 3 7
A revised Revenue Ruling on basis should treat the present value
of the annuity as the basis of the property for depreciation pur-
poses. 338 If the annuity writer sells the property during the life of the
annuitant, the basis for the annuity writer should be the total of the
principal portion of the annuity payments made before the disposi-
tion. A: loss deduction should be recognized by the annuity writer
after the annuitant has died, and the principal amount paid by the
annuity writer is certain. 339
A difficult problem arises in situations in which the annuitant
outlives his or her life expectancy. While the annuitant must treat
the entire amount of the annuity payment as ordinary income, this
result occurs because the annuitant has recovered the entire amount
invested in the contract. 340 Allowing the annuity writer to deduct the
annuity payments in full after the annuitant has outlived her life
expectancy allows an unreasonably large deduction. Instead, annuity
payments made to the annuitant after the annuitant has outlived the
annuitant's original life expectancy should be allocated between prin-
cipal and income in a method that recognizes the time value of
money and life expectancy. When the private annuitants survive their
original life expectancies, the annuity writer should treat the trans-
action as though a new annuity agreement had been reached with
336. Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352, 354.
337. Id. at 354.
338. See id. at 353 (utilizing this same treatment).
339. This approach is similar to that used in point 3 of Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B.
352, at 354.
340. I.R.C. § 72(b)(2).
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the annuitant, using the payment schedule under the annuity contract
and the annuitant's life expectancy as of the end of the originally
determined life expectancy. 41 The present value of this "constructive
annuity" at the date of the redetermination will be treated as the
"investment in the contract" for the purpose of determining the
principal portion of each annuity payment. The remainder of each
payment will be considered interest. All payments received after the
end of their original life expectancies will be considered ordinary
income for annuitants.
An example to illustrate the application of the principles of the
proposed rulings may be helpful. Aunt Anne, age fifty-nine, transfers
an income-producing capital asset with a value of $75,675 and a
basis of $20,000 to her niece, Nettie, in exchange for an annuity of
$10,000 per year to be paid at the end of each year. According to
the gift tax regulations, 342 the value of the annuity is $75,675, and
so there is no gift involved in the transfer. Aunt Anne's expected
return factor, according to the tables for single-life annuities under
section 72,343 is 25.0, and her expected return is $250,000. 344 Using
Anne's basis in her property as her investment in the contract, she
will be able to exclude $800 from each payment as a return of her
basis.345 Anne's capital gain is the fair market value of the annuity,
$75,675, less her basis in her property, $20,000, or $55,675. 34 The
capital gain will be prorated over Anne's life expectancy, 25.0 years,
for an annual capital gain of approximately $2,227.00. 347 The re-
mainder of each payment, $6,973, is ordinary income.
If Anne dies after ten years, she will have recovered $8,000 of
basis. She will receive a $12,000 capital loss for her unrecovered
341. Using the annuitant's life expectancy at a date later than the date of the original
annuity contract is similar to a concept used in Rev. Rul. 55-119, 1955-1 C.B. 352, 355. In
the Revenue Ruling, the basis of acquired property for gain purposes for an annuity writer
who sells the property during the life of the annuitant is the total amount paid under the
annuity contract as of the date of sale, plus the value of the expected payments according to
the life expectancy of the annuitant as of the date that the property was sold. Rev. Rul. 55-
119, 1955-1, C.B. 352, 355.
342. Treas. Reg. 25.2512-5(t), Table A, T.D. 7955, 1984-1 C.B. 40, 86.
343. Treas. Reg. 1.72-9, Table V, T.D. 8115, 1987-1 C.B. 22, 39.
344. $10,000, the annual payment under the annuity, multiplied by 25.0, the expected
return multiple.
345. Treas. Reg. § 1.72-4(a)(1)(i), T.D. 6211, 1956-2 C.B. 29, 36 provides for computing
an exclusion ratio of I/ER, where I is investment in the contract and ER is expected return.
Here that ratio is $20,000/$250,000, or 8%. Multiplying the exclusion ratio by the annual
payment yields a tax-free return of capital of $800.
346. See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
347. See Rev. Rul. 69-74, 1969-1 C.B. 43, 44. Anne must divide the gain, $55,675, by her
life expectancy, 25.0, for an annual gain of $2,227 per year.
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basis. If Anne lives beyond her life expectancy, she will have $10,000
of ordinary income per year.
Nettie will be treated as paying interest of $6,973 each year during
Anne's life expectancy. Nettie's interest deduction may be limited,
because the interest is probably investment interest. 348 If Nettie dis-
poses of the stock during Anne's life, her basis will be the sum of
the payments she has made to the date of the sale. At Anne's death,
Nettie's basis in the stock will be finally determined. If Anne dies
before reaching her life expectancy, Nettie will have to report a
capital gain. If Anne dies after exceeding her life expectancy, Nettie
will have to report a capital loss.
If Anne reaches age eighty-four, her life expectancy, then Nettie
must figure the tax consequences of future payments. The construc-
tive annuity will be figured as though Nettie had entered into a
$10,000 per year annuity transaction with Anne at the time Anne
completed the life expectancy on the first annuity. Anne has a life
expectancy of 7.4 years.3 49 The value of an annuity of $10,000 per
year on the life of an eighty-four-year-old individual is $36,998Y 0
Therefore, Nettie will treat $4,999.73 of each payment as return of
capital and $5,000.27 as interest.35'
VIII. CONCLUSION
The income tax treatment of private annuities, in which an indi-
vidual annuitant transfers appreciated property to another individual
in exchange for a single life annuity, has followed a tortuous path.
The actuarial principles behind annuities, that each annuity payment
consists of return of capital and interest, were well established by
the time the income tax came into being in 1913. The early income
tax, however, ignored actuarial science and adopted a simple return
of capital approach, permitting annuitants to recover all of their
premiums tax-free before having to report gross income. The income
348. See § 163(d).
349. Treas. Reg. 1.72-9, Table V, T.D. 8115, 1987-1 C.B. 22, 39.
350. Treas. Reg. 25.2512-5(0, Table A, T.D. 7955, 1984-1 C.B. 40, 86.
351. The expected return in this case is 7.4 times $10,000, or $74,000. The investment in
the contract of this constructive contract is $36,998. Therefore, the exclusion ratio is $36,998/
S74,000 or 49.99730. Multiplying the exclusion ratio by the annual payment makes $4,999.73
a "principal" payment for each annuity payment, leaving $5,000.27 as "interest." These
amounts, of course, would be rounded off to $5,000 interest and $5,000 principal. The fact
that the interest and principal payments are equal is a coincidence.
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tax treatment of private annuitants, like the income tax treatment of
annuitants generally, permitted annuitants to recover their basis com-
pletely before reporting any income. The income tax treatment of
annuity writers also ignored the interest portion of annuity payments,
treating all annuity payments as capital expenditures.
A more realistic view of commercial annuities came into the Code
in 1954 with the adoption of section 72, requiring annuitants to pro-
rate their investment in the contract over their life expectancy. But
Congress failed to establish rules governing private annuities and
failed to deal with mortality gains and losses. In Revenue Ruling 69-
72, the Internal Revenue Service finally began to apply the gain
proration principles of section 72 to the appreciated property ex-
changed for private annuities. The gain proration concepts of the
ruling, however, have not been universally adopted by the courts.
Also, the tax treatment of annuity writers still falls to recognize the
interest component of private annuity payments.
Changes made in the tax laws and in estate planning techniques
in the 1980's require a re-examination of the Service's rulings gov-
erning private annuity transactions. The revised installment sales
rules, first enacted in 1980, arguably apply to annuity transactions.
Estate planners developed similar transactions, particularly the in-
stallment sale terminating at the death of the seller, which were
economically similar to the private annuity but which had income
tax consequences very different from those of the private annuity.
Congress incorporated concepts of present value and imputed interest
wholesale into the Code in 1982 and 1984 and revised the annuity
income tax rules to recognize mortality gains and losses in 1986.
To conform to the Code's recent revisions and to reduce the
discrepancies between private annuities and death terminating install-
ment sales, the government should revise the Revenue Rulings gov-
erning the income tax consequences of private annuities. The basic
approach of Revenue Ruling 69-74, rather than the installment sales
rules, should determine the tax treatment of annuitants. The ruling,
however, should be revised to permit annuitants deductions for
mortality losses. The ordinary income portion of annuity payments
should be treated as interest for annuity writers. The rules governing
basis in property acquired for private annuities should recognize the
interest element of private annuities and should provide a detailed
scheme for computing interest and principal portions of payments
made to annuitants who out-live their life expectancies.

